Syracuse University

SURFACE at Syracuse University
Dissertations - ALL

SURFACE at Syracuse University

Summer 7-16-2021

Beetles or Bureaucrats? Reconsidering the United States' Failure
to Stop Dutch Elm Disease
Emily Bukowski
Syracuse University

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/etd
Part of the Geography Commons

Recommended Citation
Bukowski, Emily, "Beetles or Bureaucrats? Reconsidering the United States' Failure to Stop Dutch Elm
Disease" (2021). Dissertations - ALL. 1350.
https://surface.syr.edu/etd/1350

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the SURFACE at Syracuse University at SURFACE at
Syracuse University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations - ALL by an authorized administrator of
SURFACE at Syracuse University. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu.

Abstract
In this dissertation, I analyze the failure of the United States to address the Dutch elm disease
(Ophiostoma ulmi) epidemic that affected American elm (Ulmus americana) across the country.
The disease, a fungus carried by beetles between trees, was introduced in 1930 in New York City
and slowly spread across the Northeast United States and beyond. A federal program to save the
elm trees was in place from 1930-1952. I use archival documents to create a narrative describing
the management of the disease by the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, the division
of the United States Department of Agriculture tasked with controlling the fungus and its
vectors. The dissertation is organized into three body chapters, each representing a manuscript
prepared for publication in various journals. The first body chapter addresses the issues of
quarantine, both international to prevent the import of the fungus and domestic to prevent its
spread after its arrival. This chapter relies heavily on Historical Geographic Information Systems
(HGIS), a method which incorporates archival materials into modern mapmaking software. The
second chapter addresses the difficulties encountered in controlling the spread of the fungus. I
trace the different methods studied and used to reduce the number of infected trees. In both of
these chapters, I examine the failures of the Bureau to accomplish their goal of saving the elms
and highlight the key role officials played in creating a management program that was doomed to
fail by focusing on total elimination of the disease as opposed to containment and control. In the
third chapter, I use Syracuse, NY as a case study to analyze the management of Dutch elm
disease after the federal program run by the Bureau was eliminated. In this chapter, I emphasize
the role of private property as a biogeographical unit by using the lens of the commons and
demonstrating its important role in the failure to contain the fungus within the city. I conclude
the dissertation with a chapter summarizing the timeline of events and major conclusions of each

chapter while providing additional arguments of the importance of this work for urban foresters,
biogeographers and environmental historians.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The summer before I started the PhD program in Geography at Syracuse University, I was
explaining the program to my mom. Although she had gone to graduate school to become a
certified high school teacher, she was not aware of the intricacies of an academic post-graduate
degree. I explained the process of coursework, qualifying exams, and of course, the dissertation.
We discussed what my project would be about, and I explained how it built off my interest in
urban forests and environmental history. When I mentioned Dutch elm disease, she waxed poetic
about the elms in the neighborhood where she grew up, just outside of Buffalo, NY. “Those trees
were so pretty and there were so many of them,” she said, imitating the way their branches
arched up and over the street by lifting her arms as though she was starting to dance the
“YMCA.” “What ever happened to them?”
Buffalo, like many other cities across the country, cherished their elm trees. The trees
held historical significance for the community, such as one particularly impressive specimen
lending its name to the nearby suburb of Elma. 1 When urban beautification efforts swept the
country, elms were prized as street trees, and Buffalo joined the trend of turning every street into
a “majestic arboreal tunnel” using the towering canopy of the elms. 2 But from 1950 to 1977,
Buffalo’s elm population declined from 180,000 trees to just 10,000. 3 That decline prompted my
mom’s question regarding the trees from her hometown. The simple answer is that they
succumbed to Dutch elm disease, an epidemic fungus. As with most simple answers, merely

1
Ren Vasiliev, From Abbotts To Zurich: New York State Placenames (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University
Press, 2004).
2
Joe Collea, “Battle for the Elms,” New York Archives 18, no. 4 (2019): 11-14.
3
David F. Karnosky and David E. Karnosky, “Double Jeopardy for Elms: Dutch Elm Disease and Phloem
Necrosis,” Arnoldia 42, no. 2 (1982): 70–77.

1

2

stating the name of the disease raises more questions than it answers. How did the fungus get to
the United States? Why was it able to wreak so much havoc on the beloved elm populations?
What did we do to stop it? Why did those efforts fail? To answer those questions, I focus on the
work of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine. This was a division of the United
States Department of Agriculture that was placed in charge of deciding upon and implementing a
program to eradicate the fungus from the country, so as to save the millions of elms that shaded
city streets. I also use Syracuse, NY as a case study of how cities responded to the epidemic once
the federal program had ended. By doing so, I hope to provide a deeper account of the loss of
elms in the United States (and answer my mom’s question with more detail than she was
expecting).
The importance of the American Elm
Dutch elm disease is often cited as one of the worst forest epidemics in North American history,
second only to chestnut blight. Americans loved their elms so much that they were once
ubiquitous in American streetscapes. A 1936 survey estimated 25 million elms were used as
shade trees across the country, and hundreds of millions more grew in the countryside, where
people harvested them for timber and firewood. 4

4
L.H. Worthley, In Charge, Dutch Elm Disease Eradication, to Lee A. Strong, Chief, Bureau of
Entomology and Plant Quarantine, Washington, DC. Dec. 17, 1936. (Worthley to Strong, 12/17/36), Dutch Elm
Disease Control Correspondence (DED Control Corr.), Dutch Elm Disease Project Files 1935-1950, Records of the
Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, 1863 – 1956, Record Group 7 (RG7), National Archives and Records
Administration - Kansas City (RM-KC).
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The rise of the American elm (Ulmus Americana) as a cultural icon has been well
documented by urban historian Thomas Campanella. His book, Republic of Shade: New England
and the American Elm traces the tree’s rise in popularity from pre-colonial times through their
fall to Dutch elm disease. Colonists first arriving in New England needed to clear land for
agriculture. Because elms were not good for carpentry, it made little sense to spend the time and
physical effort of removing them given there was no profit for the endeavor. The remaining
trees, known as field elms, then became popular not only because they were some of the few
large trees left standing, but because they could provide shade to livestock and act as boundary
trees demarcating the borders between homesteads. Additionally, the elms were reminiscent of
their cousins in England, and stood as a nostalgic reminder of the colonists’ homeland. Elms
became cultural cornerstones as towns and villages grew up around those left standing in the
commons, and villagers planted them around their homes. 5
Through the 1800’s, those small villages transformed into the beginnings of the urban
metropolises we know today. As they transitioned from rural to urban, struggles over the
intermingling of city and country life, governance and planning led to conflicts regarding what, if
any, nature belongs in the city. 6 Despite these conflicts, elms remained a popular ornamental tree
and was planted widely in curbside right of ways, commons, parks and city centers by
enterprising private citizens and politicians. 7 Towards the end of the 1800’s, organized efforts to

5
Thomas Campanella, Republic of Shade: New England and the American Elm (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2007), 25-45.
6
Catherine McNeur, Taming Manhattan: Environmental Battles in the Antebellum City (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014).
7
Campanella, Republic of Shade, (83-124).
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sanitize and beautify the urban landscape spread throughout New England. Prior to these efforts,
cities were dirty places. Marketplaces with farm animals, a lack of water and sewer
infrastructure, and industrialization took a toll on the cleanliness and health of cities. 8 As urban
reformers advocated planting shade trees as a step in cleaning and beautifying cities, and
governments took on the roles of planning and addressing the issues created by the urban
environment, they often chose elms. The trees were already popular in the cultural imagination,
widespread in the Northeast urban landscape, and they seemed to be the perfect urban tree. Elms
grew tall before spreading their canopy, classified as vase-shaped by arborists. This left the road
clear for pedestrians while providing a corridor of shade likened to the towering ceilings of
cathedrals. 9 Though they might clash with later street widening and other modernization efforts
of the early twentieth century, the trees persisted in the difficult urban landscape that was no
longer favorable to growth. Campanella discusses these difficulties – sewer lines disrupted roots,
pavement prevented the percolation of water, and other environmental stressors led old elms to
perish and young elms to become more susceptible to pests. But contemporary urban foresters
highlight that the disturbance that came with installing these stressors would affect any tree, and
that elms are actually well suited to urban conditions such as compacted soil, drought, poor
drainage and pollution. 10 It was not until the arrival of Dutch elm disease that the American elm
was lost from the United States’ urban landscape.

8
Catherine McNeur, Taming Manhattan: Environmental Battles in the Antebellum City (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014), 6-44.
9
Campanella, 1-24.
10
Jill Jonnes, Urban Forests: A Natural History of Trees and People in the American Cityscape (Viking,
2016), 145-164.
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Placing the decline of elms in the larger context of urban forestry, Jill Jonnes argues that
the widespread death of elms occurred simultaneously with the rise of professional arborists
using their knowledge in cities. Though they were not yet called urban foresters, these arborists
drew on the knowledge of tree care and applied it in urban settings. Dutch elm disease, she
argues, was timed perfectly to allow this new profession to grow and gain value in cities.
However, the fungus was not manageable, and despite their knowledge these rising tree care
professionals could not save the elms. According to Jonnes, the focus quickly shifted from
saving the elms to replacing them with resistant cultivars. She focuses on that work, and the
efforts to re-elm the landscape. The latter has been difficult, due to genetic characteristics of
elms that make cross breeding nearly impossible and due to the virulence of the fungus.
Dutch elm disease causes and effects
When Dutch elm disease arrived in the United States in 1930, scientists knew the basics of its
biology and its effects on elms. The disease is caused by a fungus carried between trees by bark
beetles who breed in diseased trees. When the next generation emerges, they carry spores to
healthy trees when they go to feed, infecting them with the fungus. This makes them a more
appealing breeding site, and the cycle continues. The primary vector of the fungus are Scolytus
species, specifically the large European elm bark beetle (Scolytus scolytus) that was introduced
to the United States sometime in the early twentieth century. Some native species of bark beetle,
especially Hylergopinus rufipes, are also vectors, though they do not carry the fungus as
effectively as the European beetle. As the fungus grows, it blocks the flow of water between the

6

roots and the crown, eventually causing wilt and the death of the tree. 11 It is named after the
nationality of the scientists who first identified it, much to the chagrin of those in the Netherlands
who disliked the correlation of such a disastrous event to their home country. 12 But between the
discovery of the causal organism in 1922 and the arrival of the disease in the United States in
1930, the name had become too widely used, and thus it remained.
Because of the value of the elm and the potential havoc the disease could wreak, the
Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine (hereafter referred to simply as “the Bureau”)
immediately launched efforts to understand and control the disease upon its discovery in the U.S.
in 1930. 13 The Bureau had been responsible for controlling agricultural pests, notably Japanese
Beetle and the White Pine Blister Rust, since the Plant Quarantine Act of 1912, though its
specific name and structure varied throughout its history as a division of the United States
Department of Agriculture. 14 As the investigations into the disease shifted into a more
formalized program announced in 1934, their goal shifted from merely understanding the fungus
and its origins toward completely eliminating the fungus from the country. 15 At the start of this

T.A. Tattar, “Wilt Diseases of Trees: Dutch Elm Disease,” in Disease of Shade Trees (New York, NY:
Academic Press, Inc, 1978), 169.
12
S. A. Rowher, Assistant Chief of the Bureau, to Lee A. Strong, Chief, Washington, DC, Dec. 26, 1934,
L.A. Strong June 1934-Dec. 1936, Correspondence of Chief of Bureau, 1934-51, Letters, Memoranda, and Reports
Sent to Bureau Chiefs and Assistants, 1934-1951, Records of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, 1863
– 1956, Record Group 7, National Archives and Records Administration - Kansas City.
13
R. Kent Beattie, “How the Dutch Elm Disease Reached America,” presented to the Shade Tree
Conference, New York City, Sept. 1933 (Beattie, 1933), Elms - Dutch Elm Disease, Records Relating to Insects and
Diseases ca. 1927-1976, Records of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, 1863 – 1956, Record Group 7
(RG7), National Archives and Records Administration - Kansas City (RM-KC).
14
“Regulations governing importations of nursery stock by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, May 31,
1916, General Correspondence Files, 1927-91, Record Group 7, National Archives and Records Administration Kansas City.
15
L. H. Worthley, “The Present Status of Dutch Elm Disease Control Activities in the United States,”
presented at a public conference to consider the status of Dutch Elm Disease, Washington, DC, Dec. 5, 1934,
11
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program, the only known method of doing so was elimination of the host trees. There was no
cure for Dutch elm disease or preventative measure to stop a tree from becoming infected. Every
species of elm was vulnerable, and widely planted American elm seemed to be especially
sensitive to the fungus and attractive to the beetle vectors. This meant early identification,
eradication and sanitation were crucial to the success of the program. Any elm found to have the
disease was cut down and burned. The remaining stump was sheared of its bark so as not to host
the vectors. Trees that looked sickly, regardless of their infection status, were similarly removed.
This was key, given the vectors’ preference for breeding in diseased trees but feeding on healthy
elms. Removing the “beetle material” was thought to not only reduce potential hosts of the
fungus itself but reduce the population of the vector overall. Throughout the program to
eliminate the disease, scientists continued researching how it spread and how to stop it. The
research done by these scientists eventually revealed that the fungus can be hosted in dead logs
where beetles breed, and that it can spread between root grafts without a vector, because of.
After years of work and over twenty-three million dollars ($420 million in 2020 USD 16) 17
expenditure, the goal of total eradication of the disease was abandoned in favor of a control

enclosed in memo from L.H. Worthley to Lee A. Strong, Feb. 5, 1935 (Worthley, 1934), Dutch Elm Disease Control
Correspondence (DED Control Corr.), Dutch Elm Disease Project Files 1935-1950, Records of the Bureau of
Entomology and Plant Quarantine, 1863 – 1956, Record Group 7 (RG7), National Archives and Records
Administration - Kansas City (RM-KC).
16
Calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics online tool at
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm
17
Avery Hoyt, Assistant Chief of the Bureau, to Lee Strong, Chief of the Bureau, Feb. 19, 1940; Dutch
Elm Disease Control Correspondence; Records of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, 1863 – 1956,
Record Group 7; National Archives at Kansas City., E.G. Brewer, in Charge, Dutch Elm Disease Eradication, to Lee
Strong, Chief of the Bureau, Mar. 29, 1941; Dutch Elm Disease Control Correspondence; Records of the Bureau of
Entomology and Plant Quarantine, 1863 – 1956, Record Group 7, National Archives at Kansas City.
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program. Rather than trying to eliminate the fungus from the country, the Bureau attempted to
simply contain it to the ‘main disease zone,’ an area around New York harbor that included parts
of New Jersey and Connecticut as well as New York State, where most of the infections had
occurred. But as the disease continued to spread, Congress lost faith in the Bureau’s ability to
meet the goal of control and completely defunded the program in 1952. After the federal
response ended, cities were left on their own to attempt to save the elms, with varying levels of
success. They were armed only with the information provided by the now defunct control
program, and whatever expertise they were willing and able to seek out. Ultimately, Dutch elm
disease was able to overtake the country’s urban forests, and elm lined city streets are now a
distant memory.
What can be learned from Dutch elm disease?
While both Jonnes and Campanella include some information on the federal response to
Dutch elm disease in their books, they gloss over the details of the two-decade long program
implemented to save the elms. The story they tell focuses on the lack of financial resources
provided to the Dutch elm disease eradication program, the hurricane of 1938 that led to
widespread tree damage especially to the most valuable urban elms, and the loss of workers from
the program as they joined the ranks headed to fight in World War II. Both authors also relate the
work done to find, breed, clone and sell resistant cultivars of elm so that the tree can hopefully be
returned to its former glory.

9

Although the details of the ultimately failed program were not central to their narratives,
the failure of that program could provide valuable insight for contemporary management of
urban forests and their pests. Other species of trees persist in cities, and pests continue to be
introduced that threaten them. What can we learn from this failure to ensure an epidemic like
Dutch elm disease does not occur again? The most frequent answer to that question, highlighted
in urban forestry literature, is that Dutch elm disease is a cautionary tale against monocrops. By
extensively planting a single species, we enabled the spread of the fungus and ensured that
failure to control the disease would devastate the landscape. Urban foresters are still having
difficulty implementing that lesson. 18 This focus on species distribution, however, still overlooks
the work of the program meant to eradicate Dutch elm disease, in favor of analyzing the
conditions that enabled the epidemic to be so devastating – conditions created long before the
disease had even been known to exist in Europe, let alone it being known as a threat to American
elms. For twenty years, the Bureau used federal appropriations to pay for the work of the
program, including hiring men from the Works Progress Association and the Civilian
Conservation Corps when they existed, to scout, eradicate and sanitize the landscape in an effort
to save the elms. What did that work actually entail, and how was a management protocol
chosen? Why did they fail to stop the epidemic? After the federal program ended, what did cities
do to combat the disease, if anything? These questions drove the work of this dissertation. In the

A. Berland and G.P. Elliott, “Unexpected Connections between Residential Urban Forest Diversity and
Vulnerability to Two Invasive Beetles,” Landscape Ecology 29, no. 1 (2014): 141–52; M.J. Raupp, A.B. Cumming,
and E.C. Raupp, “Street Tree Diversity in Eastern North America and Its Potential for Tree Loss to Exotic Borers,”
Arboriculture and Urban Forestry 32, no. 6 (2006): 297–304.
18
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following section, I describe the methods and data I used to answer them, in hopes of providing a
more detailed – and nuanced -- account of the federal control program against Dutch elm disease.
Data and Methods
Data: In July of 2016, I traveled to Kansas
City, MO to review the records of the
Bureau Entomology and Plant Quarantine
stored at that branch of the National
Archives and Records Administration. With
the help of the archivists, I spent a month
reviewing hundreds of records kept in file
boxes like those shown in Figure 1.1. The
records were mostly comprised of
mimeographed memos, reports, and
newspaper clippings regarding the program.
As I reviewed the records, I made note of

Figure 1.1 A cart's worth of files for review at the National
Archives, Kansas City, MO.

those most relevant to my project and
scanned them using a phone app called Tiny Scanner that uploaded the images to the cloud. I
documented the information regarding each scanned record in an Excel file, noting the record’s
location in the archive, the file name I had given the scan, the date the record was created based
on information on the record itself or the file it was located in, and a brief description of the

11

information found within the record. In total, I have 626 scanned files, many of which include
more than one document in order to keep relevant paperwork together.
The archives at Kansas City also included the weekly reports generated by the program
from February 1935 - December 1944. These reports each included a qualitative description of
the week’s work followed by tabular data on the work of the field crews. The qualitative reports
include fascinating details regarding the weekly goings-on of the scout crews and the challenges
they encountered, including wild animals, gun-wielding property owners, criminals on the run,
and skeletons in the woods, along with the more banal descriptions of inclement weather,
difficult terrain and fire bans that influenced the progress of the program. Crucially, the
qualitative reports included information on first records. That is, when scouts found a diseased
tree in a township or county that had not previously been known to harbor the disease, the area
was listed in the report. The tabular data were grouped by state, and the variables reported
changed as the program and techniques changed. Through all of the reports, the number of trees
removed, the number of suspects confirmed with Dutch elm disease, and the number of infected
trees remaining in the field were listed.

12

Figure 1.2 A faded photograph of an elm-lined street, year and location
unknown, from the archives in College Park, MD.
Additionally, I spent two weeks reviewing records stored at the archives in College Park, MD.
The records listed, including images, memos and reports, in the online finding aids appeared to
complement those found in Kansas City. However, when I arrived in College Park, the archivists
informed me that many of these records had been lost. At some point, the textual records were
separated from the photographs, and had been misplaced in the process. I was able to access
some photographs, like that shown in Figure 1.2, and these provide excellent supplementary
material to visualize the effect of Dutch elm disease, though most had no descriptive information
regarding the time or location of their provenance. Similarly, several of the photographs were in
various states of disrepair, with fading, water damage or torn corners.
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Finally, as explained in Chapter 4, Syracuse provides an excellent case study for understanding
how cities attempted to save their elms after the federal program ended. Since the disease arrived
there at the same time as the conclusion of the federal program, Syracuse stands as an exemplary
illustration of how cities were left to handle the epidemic with minimal outside resources – in
terms of both funding and guidance. Tracing the history of Syracuse’s (mis)handling of the
fungus demonstrates the continued transitions in scientific understanding of the disease as well
as the unique challenges cities face when handling such environmental problems. Additionally,
while most case studies in geography focus on large cities (both in areal footprint and
population), Syracuse stands as a more useful example of environmental management given its
similarity to the majority of small to mid-sized industrial cities throughout the United States that
struggled to save their elms.
To understand how Syracuse handled Dutch elm disease, I explored the records preserved
at the Onondaga Historical Association (OHA). The files at OHA primarily consisted of
newspaper clippings and photographs regarding the Dutch elm disease program from 1950
through the early 1970’s. I supplemented these records with those available in online newspaper
databases. These clippings referenced a professor at the State University of New York College of
Environmental Science and Forestry (SUNY-ESF) who had been a vocal activist regarding the
trees, so I also visited the archives at the University’s library to investigate what, if anything, he
had left behind there. Unfortunately, although there were references to a street tree survey, he
had done in the early 1960’s, the data were no longer available. Similarly, I followed up with
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other local archives in hopes of enhancing my understanding of the community response, but
none contained significant information.
Methods and Limitations
The records found in the archives described above provide the basis for the narratives found in
the chapters that follow. By sorting the database of scanned documents, I was able to see the
progression of events and highlight the important themes of the federal program based on the
various memos and reports I found in the archive. Although I recognize the limitations of
archival records, such as ambiguity of who made the decisions regarding which records to keep
and what information may be missing, the volume of material available leads me to believe that
these records allow for the most thorough account of the history of this bureau possible. 19
Drawing on data from the weekly reports, I created a Historical Geographic Information
System (HGIS) by digitizing the tabular data into an Excel file. One aim of my analysis was to
use HGIS methods to explore the biogeography of Dutch elm disease by comparing its spread to
various environmental factors, such as terrain, weather patterns, and land use. This would
essentially be a biogeographic application of the kind of work pioneered by scholars Ann
Knowles and Ian Gregory, who have described and demonstrated the virtues of finding mappable
data in the archives to expand on our understanding of historical events. 20 Previous HGIS
On the possibilities and limitations of the archives, see Matthew Kurtz, “Situating Practices: The Archive
and the File Cabinet,” Historical Geography 29, no. 0 (2001): 26–37; Meghan Cope and Sarah Elwood, eds.,
Qualitative GIS: A Mixed Methods Approach, 1st ed (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009); James Hanlon, “Spaces of
Interpretation: Archival Research and the Cultural Landscape,” Historical Geography 29, no. 0 (2001): 14–25.
20
Anne Kelly Knowles, ed., Past Time, Past Place: GIS for History (Redlands, CA: ESRI Press, 2002);
Anne Kelly Knowles, “Emerging Trends in Historical GIS,” Historical Geography 33 (2005): 7–13; Anne Kelly
Knowles and Amy Hillier, Placing History: How Maps, Spatial Data and GIS Are Changing Historical Scholarship
19
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scholarship has provided insight into a variety of previously thought to be well understood
events, especially the effects of redlining and the workings of the iron trade in the United
States. 21 By analyzing the spread of Dutch elm disease as recorded in the Bureau’s weekly
reports, I hoped to build on an emerging trend of using HGIS method for environmental
history. 22
In my HGIS, I included the original numerical data found in the weekly reports and
notes on the qualitative report for each week, paying special attention to the commentary on first
records. Using this information, I was able to create a series of maps that visualize the spread of
Dutch elm disease as the program discovered it. However, the spatial resolution of the data did
not allow me to pursue deep HGIS and quantitative analysis of this spread. Although the first
records were often by township, and more frequently by county, the numerical data were collated
by state. Therefore, although I was able to trace the spread of the disease within each state, I
could not define that spread by intensity. That is, although I could map when counties had a
record of Dutch elm disease, it was impossible to say how the number of cases within each
county was changing. For example, it is impossible to say how many of the 2,526 cases found in
New York the week of January 12, 1935 were specifically found in Westchester county, as

(ESRI, Inc, 2008); Ian Gregory, A Place in History: A Guide to Using GIS in Historical Research (Oxford: Oxbow,
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21
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22
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opposed to Rockland county. 23 This means I was unable to compare the spread to any of the
environmental variables that might have had an influence on that spread. Despite this limitation,
the visualizations I created are still useful for understanding the federal eradication program, as I
describe in Chapter 3. While the statistical methods enabled by HGIS are powerful tools, the
visualization aspect of mapping historical data is also important and, capable of revealing key
facts to build an understanding of past events. 24 The maps created for Chapter 2 demonstrate the
value of visualization. In Chapter 3, the same first records maps overlaid with the quarantine
boundaries created using archival documents that detail the quarantine area provide support for
the main argument of that chapter.
Dutch Elm Disease and Geography
In addition to the contributions to urban forestry literature outlined above, exploring the history
of Dutch elm disease also furthers the work of biogeographers and urban environmental
historians, described below.
Biogeographers have taken an interest in “invasive species” since the term was coined by
Charles Elton in 1958. 25 While there is now no formally recognized definition of invasive
species, they are broadly recognized as a self-sustaining population of animals/plants that have

Report for the Week Ending January 12, 1935, Dutch Elm Disease Weekly Reports 1935 (WR 1935),
Dutch Elm Disease Project Files 1935-1950, Records of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, 1863 –
1956, Record Group 7 (RG7), National Archives and Records Administration - Kansas City (RM-KC).
24
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25
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1958).
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travelled far from their native range, usually with human intervention. 26 Conventionally, these
species are considered harmful to the environments they find themselves in, though both whether
a species need be harmful to be considered invasive, and what constitutes harm to an
environment at all are both topics of debate. 27 Using this and related definitions, a variety of
invasions have been studied since Elton’s seminal work on the topic, ranging across trees,
herbaceous plants, mammals, reptiles, birds and aquatic species. 28 However, although forest
pests are often labeled as invasive species, the epithet is rarely used for forest pathogens such as
Dutch elm disease. 29 Thus, this work creates a crucial bridge in the biogeographic literature by
incorporating theories and understandings of invasive species and their management to a fungal
pathogen. Similarly, for those who agree that invasive species are in some way damaging to the
environment, they often focus on the effect of a single species on the native environment to
which it has been moved. For example, an invasive grass might outcompete a native species and
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alter an ecosystem’s fire regime, or a nonnative tree might alter the seasonal water availability
within the soil and disrupt the survival of native species. 30 However, the direct effect of an
invasive species on the success another, like the necessity of the invading European bark beetle’s
presence in the United States to act as a vector and ensure the epidemic proportions of Dutch elm
disease, are rarely discussed. More general discussions on invasive species begetting more
invasive abound, but the direct correlation between two invasive species like the relationship
between Ophiostoma ulmi and Scolytus scolytus is less explicitly studied and/or acknowledged. 31
By focusing on the fungal pathogen alone, this dissertation also overlooks this fact. But implicit
in the story of Dutch elm disease is the success of its invasive vector, a story worth
understanding in its own right that would further our understanding of the epidemic even further
than this work alone. Future work extending from this project, and from biogeographers more
broadly, should investigate the direct correlation between the success of one invasive species
leading to the success of another.
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Additionally, this dissertation adds to a growing body of work on invasive species and
urban environments. Urban areas and their associated ecosystems are expanding. 32 Because of
this, biogeographers are taking an interest in understanding invasions of urban spaces and the
interconnected effects those cities and their ecosystems have on each other. 33 However, recent
growth in such work has focused specific microbiomes within cities, such as parks, riparian
areas, transportation corridors, and private green spaces like yards and green roofs. 34 As
discussed in chapter 4, Dutch elm disease demonstrates the necessity of seeing and managing the
urban forest as single ecosystem, rather than individual pockets of green space. Thus, this work
encourages a return to seeing the urban environment as a single entity requiring management of
both its constituent environments and as an aggregate of those environments as they interact with
one another, in addition to their relationship outside of the urban boundary.
Similarly, this dissertation adds to the large body of literature in environmental history.
John McNeill defined the field as “the history of the relationship between human societies and
the rest of nature on which they depended.” 35 That relationship is exemplified in urban
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environments. Cities cannot exist without a ‘natural’ hinterland which provide food and
resources yet are constantly fighting nature and potential disasters that threaten the built
environment. Urban environmental historians have long recognized this fact and have analyzed
the creation of cities in relationship to the environment in a variety of ways. An important theme
in this work is understanding the taming of nature to create cities. Trees had to be removed,
levees built, and topography levelled to account for growing metropolises in the United States. 36
Hinterlands had to be protected and tamed as the primary source of food and water for growing
populations. 37 As described above, growing cities were dirty, and infrastructure needed to be
created to keep them clean and ensure a healthy populace. 38 Controlling Dutch elm disease is a
clear extension of these themes, though an example that arose well after the affected cities had
been built and developed. The fungus is still nature that needs to be controlled, not for the benefit
of the creation of a city but for its continued existence as a functional landscape.
Finally, the story of Dutch elm disease and the loss of urban elms represents a classic
trope in environmental history: declension. That is, environmental historians often use their
platforms to describe and analyze environmental degradation that occurs at the hands of
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humanity. Case studies of lost or destroyed environments abound. 39 This has led to critiques of
the field as being a “dreary and repetitive tale of woe.” 40 While it is true that the loss of elms
described in this dissertation is often a frustrating and depressing tale, understanding the failure
to control the fungus is key to preventing it from happening again. Unlike other declensionist
environmental histories, there is an ultimate optimism presented here. While we might not
reinstate the elm to its former glory as the perfect urban tree, other species are just as suitable to
cities. We can rebuild our urban forests – and we should use our knowledge of the elms’ decline
to prevent further loss of urban trees to preventable pests and pathogens.
Chapter Outline
Three chapters outline the response to Dutch elm disease and seek to explain the ultimate loss of
urban elms. Each of these chapters is written as a standalone manuscript intended for publication
in an academic journal. Thus, they each have separate questions, related to the overall goal of the
dissertation, that guide their narrative and argument.
Chapter 2 addresses the quarantine component of the management strategy. I sought to
answer the question of why quarantines seemingly failed to achieve the basic goals one would
expect a quarantine to accomplish. There were actually two quarantines: one to prevent the
introduction of the fungus and another to prevent the spread of the disease once it had arrived.
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The former clearly failed, as the fungus entered the country despite the quarantine’s existence.
Similarly, the continued and well documented spread of the fungus across the country
demonstrates the failure of the domestic quarantine. I place these failures in the broader context
of invasive species management literature, which despite almost always suggesting quarantines
as a key measure to prevent the spread of pests, acknowledges that they rarely work. I hope to
provide some foundational evidence to improve the utilization and functionality of contemporary
quarantines beyond these halfhearted suggestions. Additionally, I situate the story of Dutch elm
disease’s failed quarantines into the larger conversations of biological exchange and invasive
species occurring in the field of environmental history. The fungus presents not only a unique
example of an invasive plant pathogen, something often overlooked in the literature, but also
provides a case study for biological exchanges that occurred in a more recent historical context.
This chapter is styled for submission to Environmental History.
Chapter 3 focuses on the eradication and control efforts of the federal management
program. Originally intended to be the statistical HGIS chapter, the narrative is aided by the
visualizations I created, although the focus is now more conceptual. Using the archival
documents described above, I chart scientists’ evolving knowledge of the disease and how this
knowledge informed governments’ eradication efforts. My goal is to add more nuance to our
understanding of the federal response to Dutch elm disease, so that future pest responses can
better utilize their time and resources to more successfully manage contemporary urban forest
crises. I use this chapter to emphasize the value of using historical studies to better inform
contemporary management, particularly of urban forests. Although this is a theme running
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throughout the dissertation, Chapter 3 presents the most compelling evidence for the argument.
This chapter is styled for submission to Arboriculture & Urban Forestry.
Chapter 4 is my answer to the question of what cities did once the federal program had
ended. I use Syracuse, NY as a case study. This chapter has already been published in
Geographical Review and thus follows its style guidelines. Using the idea of the ecological
commons, I provide a theoretical framework to explain one of the major difficulties of managing
urban forests. That is, although we consider urban forests a single ecological unit, they are
managed by property owners. In the case of Dutch elm disease, this meant that although the city
knew exactly the protocols necessary to control the spread of the fungus, they were unable to
enforce it due to private property rights. Like Chapter 3, my goal with this chapter is to provide
evidence to support future management programs at the local level.
I conclude the dissertation by reviewing the findings of the previous chapters and
emphasizing the importance of using past events to better inform contemporary management
practices. I highlight the importance of developing nuanced stories of failure so that the causes
and effects of those failures do not go overlooked and thus repeated. Finally, I discuss the future
of elms as an American shade tree, reviewing the work done by Campanella, Jonnes, and others
on the efforts to find resistant cultivars. I emphasize the need for future work on cities where
Dutch elm disease did not extirpate the local elm population, as well as more historical work on
pest management and urban forests more generally, that builds on the findings and conclusions
of this dissertation
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Chapter 2: Quarantine
American elm (Ulmus americana) was once nearly ubiquitous in American cities. From colonial
times to the early twentieth century, the cathedral-like canopy lining city streets became a
cultural icon, as elms were planted in an “almost unbroken chain across both New England and
the continent.” 1 But in 1930, Dutch elm disease (Ophiostoma ulmi) threatened idyllic Elm
Streets across the country. The federal government spent millions of dollars and over a decade to
save the elms. The efforts included a combination of scouting, eradication, sanitation and
quarantines to prevent the disease’s spread. Despite these efforts and support from the public, the
federal efforts largely failed. The program was unable to achieve the goal of eradicating the
fungus from the United States and failed to slow the fungus’ spread from New York State across
the continent. After the federal program ended, many municipalities attempted to save their elms,
but few met success. American elms have been virtually extirpated from cities across the United
States.
Though the rise of American elm has been well documented, and its loss mourned, there
has been little research examining the intricacies of the failure to save the elm. This lack of
knowledge is a problem today, as urban forests are threatened by other invasive species.
Advocates for urban forests often cite the Dutch elm disease epidemic to highlight the
importance of species diversity. They argue that the disease was able to spread and kill elms
efficiently because the trees were a near monocrop across the country’s urban landscapes. While
this is a worthwhile lesson, it overshadows the depth and breadth of information available from
Thomas Campanella, Republic of Shade: New England and the American Elm (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2007), 3.
1
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the program to fight Dutch elm disease and oversimplifies the story. Although the epidemic
occurred before Elton coined the term “invasive species” in 1958, or modern ideas of urban
forests that began in the 1960’s, it is important to more thoroughly understand the efforts to
manage the disease so that we do not reinvent the wheel as contemporary urban forests pests
become more widespread. A thorough understanding of the program to fight Dutch elm disease
provides deeper insight into the social, economic and ecological conditions that constrain such
programs as they become increasingly important and prevalent across the country. Additionally,
an analysis of this epidemic adds to a growing literature on the environmental history of invasive
species, in particular the human-invasive species relationship that is key to allowing or
preventing such pests to invade and spread. 2
In this paper, I use the archives of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine
(hereafter referred to as “the Bureau”) to examine the history of the federal response to Dutch
elm disease. A unit of the United States Department of Agriculture, the Bureau was responsible
for planning and enforcing the federally funded efforts to eradicate the fungus. I focus here on
the quarantine components of the program. Quarantines are widely cited as the first line of
defense against invasive species, and the Bureau enacted two quarantines against Dutch elm
disease – an international quarantine to prevent importation of the fungus and a domestic
quarantine to prevent the movement of elm material so as to reduce the fungus’ spread once the
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disease had arrived. Given the now well-known outcome of the Dutch elm disease epidemic, it is
clear these quarantines failed. However, the quarantines’ histories that I outline here establish
that they were insufficient due neither to a lack of knowledge regarding effective quarantines nor
to an inability to enforce such measures. Instead, the larger project’s prioritization scheme
crippled the Bureau’s ability to create a functional quarantine from the start.
The paper is organized as follows: first, I discuss the methods used to develop the case
study and maps used in this paper. Next, I briefly review the history of American elms, and the
biology of Dutch elm disease. I then provide a case study in two parts: the international
quarantine and the domestic quarantine. These are followed by a discussion of the implications
from the archival evidence for understanding why the quarantines were ineffective, and a
conclusion arguing for the utility of this case study and others like it in invasive species
management and environmental history research.
Methods
I use the files from the Bureau to examine the history of the Dutch elm disease quarantines.
These files are located in the National Archives at Kansas City, Missouri and consist primarily of
press releases, internal memos, and correspondence among Bureau employees. I separate the
quarantine case study into two parts. First, I describe the international quarantine, which was
initially created to prevent the import of the causal organism. Even after the fungus was found in
the United States, the international quarantine remained in place to prevent further import of the
fungus. This component of the study is based on the memos, reports, etc. found in the archives,
and does not include maps. The second component of the case study focuses on the domestic
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quarantine, which was used to prevent the movement of the fungus outside of a known area to
reduce the spread of the disease.
For the domestic quarantine, I use the information present in the archives to map the
quarantine and the spread of the fungus in a historical geographic information system (HGIS).
HGIS methods have become increasingly useful tools to visualize evidence present in archives
and to support the information provided by narrative documents. 3 I created maps based on
information from the quarantine notices themselves, which in addition to explaining the
restrictions and protocols of the quarantine, list the affected counties and townships. I created
mappable quarantine boundaries by selecting the townships listed in each version of the
quarantine, adding new township boundaries with each of the quarantine updates. For the first
version of the quarantine, there are 24 townships bounded by the outermost extent of the
quarantine, but not actually listed in the document. This is likely because the earliest available
shapefile from the United States Census Bureau of townships is for 2007. Townships that
became independent after the first domestic quarantine would not be listed individually, as they
would have been a part of another listed county or town.
The maps also show counties with known presence of Dutch elm disease, based on the
qualitative component of the weekly reports created by the eradication program. Starting in

Anne Kelly Knowles, ed., Past Time, Past Place: GIS for History (Redlands, CA: ESRI Press, 2002);
Anne Kelly Knowles, “Emerging Trends in Historical GIS,” Historical Geography 33 (2005): 7–13; Ian Gregory
and Paul Ell, Historical GIS Technologies, Methodologies, and Scholarship (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2007); Alexander von Lünen and Charles Travis, eds., History and GIS: Epistemologies, Considerations and
Reflections (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013); H.R. Southall, “Applying Historical GIS beyond the Academy: Four Use
Cases for the Great Britain HGIS,” in Toward Spatial Humanities: Historical GIS and Spatial History, 2014, 92–
117,; Ian Gregory, “Further Reading: From Historical GIS to Spatial Humanities: An Evolving Literature,” in
Toward Spatial Humanities: Historical GIS and Spatial History, 2014, 186–202.
3

28

February 1935, the scouts finding and eradicating infected trees sent reports back to the head
office of the Bureau. These reports were summarized on a weekly basis, creating a tabular
dataset showing, among other variables, the number of trees infected, and the number of trees
removed. The tabular data were prefaced with a qualitative report including ‘first records’ of
townships and counties where Dutch elm disease had been newly discovered. In digitizing the
tabular data, I included these noted first records. This allowed me to map the counties where the
disease had been found and overlay the quarantine boundary for comparison. Of note, these first
records were not always contiguous to each other or to the previously determined area of
infection. Because they relied on reports sent in from the field, weekly reports sometimes left
gaps where reports had not arrived in time for the weekly compilation. For each update of the
quarantine, I used the weekly report corresponding to when the quarantine information was put
into practice. Thus, the maps show the quarantine boundary in comparison to the most up to date
known area of infestation. The map of the original quarantine does not include areas of infection
because the quarantine effective date coincides with the first weekly report and a complete list of
affected counties had not yet been compiled.
As I will discuss below, the tabular data of the reports aggregated the areas where Dutch
elm disease is found by state and then any infection not contiguous to the known zone was listed
as “Other.” I discuss the implications of this data management decision later in the paper. These
reports also included information on the week’s work, including information regarding training
new scouts, difficulties in the field such as inclement weather or disgruntled homeowners, and
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other interesting facts and figures about the project that had arisen that week. While interesting,
these anecdotes were not relevant to the quarantine aspect of the project.
American Elm and Dutch Elm Disease
By the early twentieth century, nearly 25 million elms graced city streets across the
country as the nation’s preferred shade tree. 4 The history of these elms is well documented.
Original colonists favored oak and maple for building, leaving elms to grow in fields. As towns
and villages grew, the elms left behind grew large and stately, with those growing in parks and
commons becoming landmarks. Trees throughout New England were marked as “Washington
elms,” with stories of the first president having meetings in their shade for various political and
military dealings. 5 As villages grew to cities, elms were planted en masse. They handled the
difficulties of urban life well, and their vase-shaped canopy provided shade without interrupting
pedestrians below. 6 By the 1920’s, elms had become “an almost universal element of the
American urban landscape.” 7 In addition to the importance of urban elms, over a billion elms
grew in the countryside, where people harvested them for timber and firewood. 8
When elms in Europe began dying from a mysterious disease in the late 1910’s,
American foresters were wary of the potential havoc such a disease could cause in the United
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States. 9 The disease was eventually identified in 1922. It was named after the nationality of the
Dutch scientists who identified it, though it was found throughout the continent. 10 Dutch elm
disease is the result of a fungus that blocks the movement of water through trees’ xylem. The
origin of the fungus in Europe is unknown. It affects nearly all species of elm, and finding a
resistant cultivar is a popular topic for research. 11 The fungus is carried by bark beetles. The
beetles breed in diseased trees, and the next generation carries the spores when they emerge. The
vectors’ preference for breeding in dying elms but feeding on healthy ones makes them
particularly effective at spreading the fungus to new stands of elms. The European species of
bark beetle that acts as a vector had been present in the United States for several decades before
the fungus was known to be in the country. Other beetles native to the United States can also
carry the fungus, though they are not as efficient as vectors. Though it took years after the
fungus’ initial identification to determine these specifics about the disease, the general picture of
how the disease killed elms and spread among trees was well known by the time the disease
reached the United States. During the Dutch elm disease eradication project, further
understanding of the disease, such as its spread via root grafts and best practices for eradication
were discovered by scientists working for the Bureau.
Foresters hoped that as with the laws created to protect other American agricultural
interests, the USDA would enact quarantines that would prevent Dutch elm disease from
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crossing the Atlantic. 12 By 1930 they were dismayed to learn the fungus was present in the
United States, though a general outbreak did not occur until 1934. This extensive outbreak of
1,700 infected elms in an area surrounding New York harbor inspired a massive response by the
federal government to find and eradicate all occurrences of the disease. Most of the project’s
resources went to eradicating the disease, with scouts sent into the affected states to find and
destroy infected trees. Scouts also engaged in efforts of sanitation. This refers to the process in
which dead or dying elms, collectively known as ‘beetle material,’ were destroyed to reduce
breeding habitat for the vectors.
Before the eradication project was fully realized, the Bureau set about creating
quarantines to control the spread of the disease. In this paper, I focus on this component of
management for two reasons. First, the limited literature explaining the failure to save the elms
rarely mentions the quarantine efforts outside of the context of their failure to prevent the initial
importation of the fungus. 13 This overlooks both the nuances of why the initial quarantine failed
and the domestic quarantine put in place to prevent movement of beetle material and infected
wood outside of the area known to be infected. Second, most contemporary literature on invasive
species management includes recommendations to enact quarantines against pest introductions,
with some including cost benefit analysis to understand the best combination of quarantine and
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other management strategies. 14 Charles Elton, who coined the term ‘invasive species’, suggested
quarantines as a method to tackle the problem of invasive species before they even arrived. But
he acknowledged throughout his work that quarantines were often futile against invading pests. 15
By more thoroughly examining the quarantines to prevent the introduction and spread of Dutch
elm disease, I hope not only to develop a deeper understanding of why quarantines did not save
the elms, but also to find lessons for contemporary management efforts.
International Quarantine
As the disease spread through Europe in the 1920’s, America’s professional arborists urged the
Secretary of Agriculture to “use every practicable means” to protect the large elm populations
across the country. 16 Some ports noted they had been refusing entry of elm wood to prevent
spread of the fungus as early as 1927, though no formal quarantine required them to do so. 17
There was no concentrated effort to create such a quarantine until 1930, when the first discovery
of Dutch elm disease in Ohio led the Bureau to investigate how the fungus had entered the
country. Though Ohio tree professionals were quick to identify and remove the infected elms, the
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mystery of how trees in the Midwest came to be infected at all remained. 18 Memos between the
various chiefs and assistants of the Bureau detail their search for the disease’s entry point.
Congress had banned the importation of elm nursery stock except for scientific purposes
since 1919, and even those permits had been forbidden since 1928. Thus, the Bureau instead
focused on imports of elm wood for the furniture industry, elm parts used in shipping material,
and seeds. 19 Investigators tracked down as many shipping records as they could and found that
there seemed to be little importation of elm at all. Between 1919 and 1933, they found only 15
records of Ulmus shipments. 20 The ubiquity of the American elm meant there was little reason
for American industries to import elm logs. 21 But like the boom in chestnut sales when chestnut
blight wiped out that species in the U.S., Dutch elm disease was leading European loggers to
make use of elm lumber before it was destroyed. Thus, the market for elm burl logs flourished.
Burls, growths on trees that have a knobby and twisted appearance, could be used for veneer
when sliced thin and polished. According to an unnamed expert, in 1933 elm burl veneer was
just coming into fashion in the United States and demand was expected to increase because of its
attractive appearance and similarity to curly maple. 22
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On August 7, 1933, L.M. Scott, a plant quarantine inspector at the port of Baltimore, was
examining a shipment of ten elm burl logs from France. He found that the logs, bound for a
veneer plant in Kentucky, were infested with what was later identified as Scolytus scolytus, the
European elm bark beetle known to be a vector of Dutch elm disease. The logs were then
cultured and found to be infected with the fungus that causes the disease, Graphium ulmi (now
Ophiostoma ulmi). In the following weeks, further reports from both New York City and
Norfolk, Virginia confirmed that burl logs were the ultimate culprit, solving the mystery of how
the fungus arrived in the United States. 23 This discovery finally enabled the Bureau to begin
drafting an official quarantine preventing the import of products that could be carrying Dutch
elm disease. This was especially important given the simultaneous discovery of a large swath of
approximately 1,700 elms infected with the disease in New York and New Jersey. 24 In a press
release announcing public hearings about the potential quarantine, Secretary of Agriculture H. A.
Wallace stated, “In view of the prompt efforts being taken to eradicate the disease, the necessity
for protecting the country against further introduction from abroad is regarded as important.” 25
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Using the notes from the hearing, officials were able to draft an official elm quarantine
that went into effect October 21, 1933. 26 Pathologists at the hearing advised excluding all logs
with bark, seeds, plants and cuttings from plants in the Ulmaceae family. Shipping materials that
contained bark would also be restricted from entering the country. Logs that had been debarked
and treated in a hot water bath would be allowed, as well as already manufactured veneer. 27 In an
announcement of the new quarantine, Secretary Wallace noted that “…the new quarantine seeks
to close as effectually as possible every avenue to the entrance of the disease but at the same time
seeks not to hamper any trade movement that could be permitted with safety.” 28 In the Bureau’s
previous investigation, they had found that of 250 veneer factories, only a dozen of them were
importing elm burl wood. For those few factories, it was difficult to trace exactly how many elms
they were using, given that logs were most often “included in Customs Reports under the
miscellaneous heading ‘Other logs and round timber.’ In the trade they pass under several names,
one being ‘Carpathian elm’.” 29 They also could not trace the burl wood based on origin because
although its trade name implied growth in the Carpathian Mountains, the burls were actually
found across Europe. 30 Despite the uncertainty, the fact that elm veneer had only recently
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become fashionable and the limited identifiable cases of elm imports, led officials to allow the
exception.
Those importing the burls would have to follow a strict protocol. Logs needed to be
stripped entirely of bark before entering the country at all. This was to prevent the beetles that
live under the bark from surviving the voyage from Europe. The beetles had already entered the
United States for at least two decades prior, but by ensuring the logs were not themselves
carrying a vector, officials hoped to prevent potentially contaminated individuals from escaping
at the port of arrival. Once arrived, the logs would be treated in a hot water bath of 180°F. The
goal was to heat the center of the log to high enough of a temperature to kill any fungal infection,
so the timing varied based on the size of the log, though the quarantine required a minimum of
two hours. 31 After some dispute from importers claiming such a long hot water bath would ruin
the wood, the protocol was adjusted. The logs needed to only sit in 212°F water for twenty
minutes, to insure the outer most rings where the fungus was most commonly found was heated
through. 32
In the first year, only nine shipments of burl wood totaling 66 logs were permitted and
entered the country. Though importers seemed to be cooperating with the limitations set by the
quarantine, inspectors at various ports were raising concerns. In one report, an inspector found
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that an importer had removed most bark from the
logs but had neglected the “knots and crevices” of
the logs. The remaining bark totaled 30 pounds of
material, and was infested with Scolytus beetles,
larvae and eggs. The inspector overseeing the work
noted that the additional cost of labor was, “hardly
sufficient as a penalty to warrant the importer or
foreign shipper make any changes in bark
removal.” 33 Two other shipments had also been
insufficiently debarked, and Scolytus beetles and
larvae were found living under the remaining
pieces. The importers finished the debarking at the

Figure 2.1 Crate with "stays" made of elm
wood without adequate bark removal
(Enclosed in a letter from the Division of
Plant Quarantine to a concerned citizen).

port, but the chief of the quarantine division suggested it was time to stop allowing burl
imports. 34 Effective December 1, 1934, the quarantine was updated such that “no chance should
be taken which would result either in further introduction of the causal fungus or in the equally
undesirable establishment here of its Scolytid carriers.” 35 No more elm wood, in any capacity,
could be imported into the United States from Europe.
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Despite the embargo, quarantine inspectors were kept busy with ensuring packing
materials were not made of elm, or that components made of elm were completely debarked. In
1941 alone, a report noted that of 5,160 crates examined, 232 used elm material. Of those, 12
were carrying the fungus. 36 Inspectors gave three reasons for difficulties in effectively enforcing
the quarantine. First, the wood used in packing material (e.g. Figure 2.1) was difficult to identify
as elm at all. Second, port inspectors were looking for many different pests under other
regulations, not just the beetles and fungus causing Dutch elm disease. Finally, the quarantine
division argued it was underfunded and understaffed given the increasing volume of trade and
number of ports. A report on the issue stated the situation boldly:
Statistics reveal the facts. During the past year [1934], there were inspected at the fortytwo ports of entry over 29,000 vessels, more than 3,000 airplanes and about 40,000
parcel-post packages…In the course of this inspection…there were over 25,000
interceptions during the year of materials carrying insects and plant diseases, the pests
including more than 1,200 definitely recognized species of insects and over 160 wellidentified kinds of plant-disease fungi and bacteria. 37
This resource/staffing issue persisted throughout the federal program to control and eradicate
Dutch elm disease, though internal discussion of these activities became limited beyond those
three factors (that is, there is little archival material available discussing the quarantine after the
complete ban on all imports). The international quarantine was not updated again until October
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1947, banning imports from Canada – though not until two years after the disease had been
discovered there. 38
It is easy to speculate about the reasons the Bureau was so slow to react to the impending
danger of Dutch elm disease and were thus unable to prevent its introduction. Perhaps policy
makers were pushing for a quarantine with limited economic impact, despite the infrequency of
elm imports. This might explain why no preventative policy was put in place in the eight years
between the initial discovery of the causal agent of the disease and its arrival in the United
States. Maybe once the first infection was identified, solving the mystery of its arrival was more
scientifically interesting than preventing further appearances. This could explain why it took four
years to enact an embargo on elms after the disease arrived. If other events of the era – the Great
Depression, the Second World War – were affecting their ability to enact and enforce quarantine
measures, they did not explicitly discuss it. Regardless of speculation on the specific reasoning
behind their actions or lack thereof, it is clear that scientists and policy makers alike suffered
from a failure of imagination. They failed to imagine a scenario where such limited imports
could bring enough fungus to cause disease in the United States. They failed to imagine and
comprehend the already deeply intertwined economic and transportation systems that could bring
those few imports and the fungus they carried great distances. They could only react to these
facts when it was too late – the disease had taken hold, and without further precautions would
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spread widely. Even then, they failed to imagine how dramatically this epidemic might effect the
landscape, or that quarantines could be used to protect them, as shown by the failure of the
domestic quarantine, outlined below.
Domestic Quarantine
After the Bureau enacted the ban on importing elm material, officials could move on to
considering a domestic quarantine to aid the eradication efforts. In February 1935, the Bureau
held a public hearing in Washington, DC to gather input on a potential interstate quarantine to
prevent the movement of elm material. A report written by L.H. Worthley, the head of the Dutch
elm disease eradication project, was presented at the hearing. The report summarized several
research findings done by the scientific branch of the eradication project, and detailed the
Bureau’s justifications for quarantining New York, New Jersey and Connecticut – the three
states that encompassed what was usually referred to as the ‘infected zone’ or ‘main disease
area.’ A radius of approximately forty miles extending from New York harbor had been the
subject of an intense federal management program to scout, identify and destroy diseased trees.
The goal of the program was to fully eliminate the disease from the country. From June 1933 to
February 1935, almost eight thousand diseased elms had infections confirmed via laboratory
culture in this nearly 2,500 square mile main disease zone. 39 Scouting in the perimeter of this
area, however, had shown the disease was not spreading outside of the main zone. While
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infections had occurred in other states, these incidences were not associated with sustained
disease presence. That is, one or two trees would be found infected and removed, and no further
evidence of infection would be found in the area. These findings, in addition to their knowledge
of the disease’s vectors, demonstrated to officials that the infection was somewhat contained to
the tri-state area, so the quarantine efforts would focus on these states alone as opposed to a
universal embargo on elm trade across the entire country. 40
After discussing where to enact the quarantine, Worthley’s report covered what specific
elm materials were subject to restrictions. In their investigations of elm trade, the Bureau had
found no evidence of Dutch elm disease on elm seedlings and saplings grown by tree nurseries in
the infected zone. Additionally, of the trees sold by such establishments, it seemed the nurseries
were only selling trees within short distances. Trackable sales, of which there were few,
remained within the infected zone. Investigators also reported that many tree nurseries were
discontinuing elm sales not only due to Dutch elm disease, but because of other pests like
Japanese beetle that defoliated the saplings. The report concluded that, “A quarantine to confine
nurseries to inter-area elm sales would appear to offer little hardship in their operations.” 41
Another concern was professional tree movers. Though rare, it was quite profitable to move
large, established trees. It was unlikely someone would perform such a service with a known
diseased tree, given that such movers frequently laid out guarantees for the tree’s life in its new
location. However, concerned that movers might not recognize the very early signs of the disease
or would be willing to risk moving a short term guaranteed tree for profit, investigators
40
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suggested limiting these activities as well. 42 Other concerns included the use of elms as fuel
wood and building material. It was difficult to identify the amount of such use, and whether
wood for these purposes was moving in and out of the infected zone. Despite the limited
knowledge, the report concluded that limiting such activities would pose little hardship. 43
Based on the above information, Worthley concluded that the quarantine would entail
preventing any Ulmus material from moving out of the infected zone, but movement within
could continue. This included living trees, any part of a tree, and shipping materials made of elm
that were not free from bark. Inspection and certification could not be included in the quarantine,
given that identifying the fungus could not be conclusively done in the field. States, regardless of
whether or not they contained part of the infected zone, could enact their own quarantines in
addition to these federal regulations. 44 There was no recorded dissent to Worthley’s report at the
public hearing where it was presented, and the eradication project proceeded with creating the
quarantine as per his and his project’s recommendations. Although the Bureau established the
rules of the quarantine, enforcement was left to the affected states. 45
Shortly after the hearing, the acting chief of domestic plant quarantines, R.A. Sheals, sent
a memo to the chief of the Bureau highlighting concerns with the quarantine as written from the
hearing notes. While Sheals had not had a hand in writing the quarantine, as that had been the
task of the Worthley and employees of the eradication project itself, he was the head of the
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division tasked with enforcing domestic quarantines. Based on his experience, he argued that
because “species of the genus Ulmus are planted extensively in practically every State in the
Union,” and that “present information as to many important features of natural spread is
admittedly far from complete,” 46 the soon to be enacted quarantine was inadequate. First, the
quarantine only restricted the genus Ulmus as opposed to the family Ulmaceae. This distinction
meant up to eight genera of plants were not under restriction despite their ability to carry and
move the disease and its vectors. Second, he noted that the quarantine only covered the areas
where the disease had already been found. No protective zone surrounding the main disease area
was included in the quarantine. Third, the Bureau could only add area to the quarantine if
infection was documented, meaning their additions were always reactive rather than proactively
enforcing the protective measures the quarantine was meant to provide. That is, because area
could only be put under quarantine if the disease was present, the quarantine was unable to
effectually prevent the spread of the fungus to new areas. Finally, the quarantine did not cover
the areas of incidental infection. States that were outside the contiguous disease zone but did
have known infection -- Ohio, Virginia, Maryland and Indiana -- were left to their own devices
in terms of regulating movement of elm material. Though there were usually very few trees
infected, and those had been thought to have been eradicated quickly, it was still unclear how
those infections were appearing and what the long-term infection rate in these areas might be.
Addressing these concerns would require a new public hearing on the quarantine, but Sheals
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argued that the changes “are justified because apparently if the disease is not eradicated it will in
turn eradicate the host plants,” and because of the economic value of elms as ornamental shade
trees across the country. 47
Sheals’ suggestions were largely ignored. The quarantine went into effect on February
25, 1935. It covered only the specific areas where the disease had already been found in the main
disease zone. It prohibited the movement of elms and elm parts out of the main disease area but
shipping within the zone was allowed. There was an exception for building and shipping material
made of elm wood, if it was completely free of bark. There was also an exception made for
materials being shipped for scientific purposes, though the materials needed to be approved and
labeled as such. 48 Sheals’ one victory appears to have been regarding the addition of territory to
the regulated area. There was no condition that an area must have documented infection to be
included in the quarantined zone, the regulation stating only that the designated areas “may be
extended or reduced as may be found advisable by the Secretary of Agriculture.” 49 However, as
discussed below, the record suggests that the quarantine updates only included areas based on
their infection status.
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Figure 2.2 Maps showing the changing quarantine boundary from its initial writing in
1935 (a), with updates in 1937 (b), 1939 (c) and 1941 (d). Image created by author.
In the remainder of the federal response to the disease, there is archival evidence for four
updates to the quarantine, though only three include full lists of affected areas. 50 The original
quarantine (Figure 2.2(a)), covered just over 3,500 square miles. It included seven townships in
one county of Connecticut, part or all of nine counties of New Jersey, and part or all of eight
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counties in New York as controlled areas. Figure 2.2(a) does not include disease presence
information because although the weekly scouting reports began in February of 1935, no
comprehensive list of affected townships was available until 1936. Because of this, it is
impossible to say whether the quarantine ever actually fully contained every township where a
diseased elm had been found within the main disease zone. But, given that the quarantine never
covered the incidental infections in other states, it is evident that the quarantine never
encompassed all areas of known infections.
The first update, in 1936, is not fully documented. There is no full list of townships
extant, though the second update, in 1937, references such a list. The 1937 update added three
more townships, one in each state, though only one of them was contiguous to the original
quarantine area (Figure 2.2(b)). Based on the text of this update, it is probable that the missing
1936 update would have expanded the quarantine zone, and that these three townships were
contiguous to the new disease zone. Unlike the other updates, the 1937 additions were
documented in a memo rather than an official quarantine pamphlet. It stated that, “Elms infected
with the Dutch elm disease have been located around the periphery of the area regulated in
Quarantine 71, effective November 9, 1936.” 51 This difference is important for two reasons.
One, the memo included provides some evidence as to the rationale behind the quarantine
updates. That is, although it may not have been happening frequently, the updates were in
response to newly found infections in the field expanding the disease zone. Second, comparing
the 1937 addition of three townships to the extensive number of counties where the disease is
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actually present shows that even if the quarantine was being updated yearly, it always lagged
behind discoveries of new infections in the field.
The 1939 update expanded the affected area much more than the 1937 update, with the
total number of affected counties rising to three in Connecticut, thirteen in New Jersey, and
fourteen in New York, covering a total of 8,221 square miles (Figure 2.2(c)). The final update in
1941 would add parts of nine counties in Pennsylvania, while continuing the trend of expansion
in the other affected states. In total, the quarantined area now covered 12,291 square miles
(Figure 2.2(d)). The regulated area found in figure 2.2(d) is unique because of its disjointed
nature. Several townships in Pennsylvania, New York and Connecticut were quarantined, but
were not contiguous to the main disease zone. Although the previous update also had two
townships that were not contiguous, the final update had a much more extensive scattershot
pattern. Also notable is the removal of a township on Long Island, evidence that the Bureau
hoped to quarantine as small of an area as possible by removing areas deemed infection free.
Six years later, the domestic quarantine was lifted. The announcement confirmed that no
updates to the quarantine occurred between 1941 and 1947. During this time frame, however, the
quarantine was still a topic of correspondence within the Bureau. Most notably, in a report
regarding how to prioritize components of the eradication project during the United States’
participation in World War II, the chief of the program wrote that “Quarantine against the
movement of diseased material should be kept up-to-date by the addition to the regulated area of
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newly found infected townships.” 52 He also discussed the value in scouting for the disease in the
periphery of the known main disease area, though he does not suggest expanding the quarantine
to include it. A similar report found that six states (Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, West
Virginia, Ohio and Indiana) were battling Dutch elm disease but would not be added to the
quarantine, given the states’ commitment to their own programs. 53 Additionally, scouting had
found no evidence of the disease along railroads that had transferred burl wood to veneer plants
across the country out of the main disease zone, suggesting these corridors need not be added to
the quarantine or considered for future eradication efforts.
The notice ending the quarantine stated, “the Federal domestic quarantine does not
provide practical means for preventing spread of the disease.” 54 According to this notice, the
beetle vectors, both introduced and otherwise, were “much more widespread than was known
when the quarantine was last revised” including “well beyond the known limits of the disease.” 55
This, in addition to the assumption that the natural movement of vectors could carry the disease
further than any movement of commodities, was the primary reason cited for lifting the
quarantine. Nursery stock had proven to be an insignificant carrier of the fungus, and logs for
firewood and building were being moved locally rather than long distances. 56 Of forty states
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contacted, only 12 noted a preference for maintaining the federal quarantine. 57 Thus, it was
deemed impractical to continue enforcing the quarantine. The Secretary of Agriculture, Clinton
P. Anderson, revoked the quarantine in March, to be effective May 1, 1947. 58 The remainder of
the federal program to eradicate Dutch elm disease was slowly defunded in the following years,
and completely ended in 1952, though the disease continued to spread westward and is still
found throughout the country today. 59
Why did the quarantines fail?
The stated purpose of the domestic quarantine was “preventing the further spread of the Dutch
elm disease, which at present is known to exist in parts of New Jersey, New York and
Connecticut.” 60 Figure 2.2 clearly demonstrates that the domestic quarantine failed to meet this
goal. Similarly, the international quarantine was aimed at preventing the import of the causal
fungus and, after its arrival, limiting its repeated reintroduction. The existence of Dutch elm
disease in the country at all demonstrates the failure of the initial international quarantine, and
while it is not well documented, there were clear difficulties in preventing its reintroduction due
to shipping materials made of elm. Reviewing the story behind these policies reveals that they
57
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appear to be an almost forgotten side project of the management program. Only created once the
disease was a problem, and rarely updated, it seems they were doomed from the start. The
question, then, is why? Why were the authors and enforcers of this policy so reluctant to give the
quarantines the clout needed to truly aid the eradication and control project? Below, I discuss
what appears to be the cause of the quarantines’ poor implementation, before addressing the
specific shortcomings of the policies in more depth.
In 1936, the chief of the Bureau, Dr. Lee A. Strong, was asked to make an address to the
annual meeting of the Phytopathological Society on “Plant Diseases and Federal Plant
Quarantines.” The statement was prepared by Mr. W.A. McCubbin, a senior pathologist for the
Bureau. In the draft, Strong made few edits. A few corrections to numerical figures, some
grammatical changes, and a slash through a paragraph show Strong’s general approval of the
statements in the manuscript. These statements reveal much of the mindset behind the structure
of both the international and domestic quarantines against Dutch elm disease. While the bulk of
the manuscript argued that improved technology, increased budgets, and more favorable public
opinion were making quarantines easier and more effective, McCubbin and Strong emphasized
the difficulty of applying such quarantines to plant diseases as opposed to insects. They stated
that, “We may as well accept the fact, however reluctantly, that in the field of plant diseases our
routine quarantine methods can not be depended on to furnish the same measure of national
protection that may be expected of them in the case of insects.” 61 In the conclusion, they
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highlighted that there were trends toward increased movements of agricultural products and
increased recognition of the economic consequences of plant pests. Because of this, they
suggested that drastic quarantines against every plant disease threat were untenable. Rather,
policymakers should carefully consider the utility and potential effectiveness as well as the
consequences of such action. He gives no framework for how one might do this.
Given that Strong, as chief of the Bureau, was ultimately in charge of how the quarantine
policy was implemented, this address gives key insight into the workings of the Bureau and the
outcome of the quarantine policy. Despite R.A. Sheals’ and his colleagues in the department of
Domestic Plant Quarantine clearly disagreeing with how the quarantine was initially written (as
documented above), Strong’s veto power as the chief of the entire Bureau, enabled him to enact
the quarantine as he pleased. Knowing that Strong had presented his negative opinion on the
utility of quarantines within a year of their development, that this was the opinion of the man in
charge of approving the quarantine, and that those writing the quarantines were ultimately
restricted to writing a policy he would agree with, helps us in hindsight to more thoroughly
understand the decision-making process. It is not that Strong and his contemporaries at the
Bureau did not agree with Sheals’ interpretation of the quarantine’s shortcomings. Instead, they
hoped to be thoughtful when applying the limitations of the quarantine, so as to limit any
negative impacts such regulation might have. This includes the broader impact on public opinion
if an intense quarantine were to fail, given the economic implications of restricting trade. Their
discriminating mindset led to two major failures of the quarantines.
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The first failure of the quarantines was their reactive instead of proactive approach.
Efforts to create an international quarantine were not initialized until after the fungus was found
in the country. Severe limitations were not implemented until the risk of interrupting trade was
perceived to be outweighed by the damage of the disease. A total embargo was not enforced until
all efforts to create exceptions had been explored and deemed unenforceable. Although it is
unlikely that an embargo on elm products made as soon as the fungus was identified in 1922
would have effectively kept the disease out forever, limiting elm imports and alerting quarantine
officials of the threat sooner might have kept it out longer and enabled a quicker discovery of the
disease’s path into the country. Even without an embargo on elm products prior to the disease’s
entry, acknowledging the disease’s existence and potential impact, and tracking elm shipments
prior to the fungus’ arrival would have expedited the research required to plan and pass the initial
international quarantine.
As shown in Figure 2.2, the domestic quarantine was similarly reactive. At no point did
the quarantine boundary completely encompass the area of known infections, not only because
the incidental infections in other states were not included but because the quarantine was only
updated to reflect known disease presence. As Sheals pointed out, more effective efforts would
have expanded the quarantine to include an area where infection was not necessarily confirmed,
but possible due to proximity to the main disease area. This would have limited the movement
not only of known diseased material, but material that potentially carried the fungus as well. The
lack of an expanded quarantine perimeter is especially puzzling given that the eradication side of
the management program had scouts exploring a ten-mile “protective zone” around the areas of
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known infection to identify if that area needed to be expanded. Additionally, exclusion from the
quarantine area of Ohio, Virginia, Maryland, and Indiana, and any other states where the fungus
had been repeatedly found likely expedited the spread of the disease across the country, beyond
the incremental spread from the main disease zone. Including a zone around the main disease
area, in addition to applying quarantine in the ‘other’ locations of known infection would have
enabled the quarantine effort to actively prevent the movement of the fungus, rather than always
‘playing catch up’ to the scouting efforts.
The second failure of the quarantines was ignoring the known biology of the disease.
Despite knowing that Dutch elm disease was a vector borne fungus, the quarantines were written
exclusively about the fungus itself. No provisions were made regarding a quarantine of the
vectors or material that could harbor or expand the vector population. This is perhaps due to the
overlap in such materials. However, including limitations based on the presence of the vector
would have enabled inspectors to further limit the movement of diseased material. Whereas there
was no condition for identifying the fungus in the field, since it required laboratory confirmation,
beetles could have readily been identified in shipments of elm material and been used as
evidence to stop their movement. This is less relevant to the international quarantine, given that
the vectors were present in the United States well before the fungus was. But for the domestic
quarantine, the fungus could spread to wherever the vectors were found. Therefore, an effective
policy would have made efforts from the beginning to not only limit the movement of the
fungus, but to identify and limit the area of the vectors’ presence as well.
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Quarantines, Invasive Species, and Environmental History
In his work on invasive species, Charles Elton, the widely acknowledged father of the concept, 62
noted the potential utility of quarantines in preventing the spread of alien pests. Preventing the
import of a foreign species, he argued, was the first line of defense against explosive invasions. 63
The idea of a quarantine was far from new at the time of his writings, with countries in Europe
having enacted laws preventing the movement of plant and animal material as early as 1899. 64
The United States enacted such a law, the Plant Quarantine Act of 1912, to regulate the
movement of nursery stock and prevent the importation of pests and diseases. 65 Elton mentioned
the importance of such regulations in the face of increasing trade and travel, stating “A hundred
years of faster and bigger transport has kept up and intensified this bombardment of every
country by foreign species, brought accidentally or on purpose, by vessel and by air, and also
overland from places that used to be isolated.” 66 More than a half century later, research
continues to support the idea that increased trade will result in higher numbers of species
introductions, with potential harmful impact if those species become invasive. 67
Quarantines continue to be an important part of preventing the exchange of invasive
species between countries and calls for quarantines to limit spread of established species are
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frequently included in management literature. 68 Today, at least forty-two treaties addressing
environmental issues include provisions regarding quarantines relating to the regulation of
invasive species, though they rarely provide specifics on how to achieve this goal. 69 Even studies
focused on other components of pest management include an acknowledgement of quarantines as
a preventative measure. 70 However, there is doubt regarding the effectiveness of quarantines in
preventing species introductions, especially compared to other management techniques, leading
to feasibility studies and cost effectiveness analyses to better understand the utility of such
policies. 71
What many of these studies lack is a historical lens regarding what enabled a successful
or unsuccessful quarantine. While models may be useful in theorizing a perfect response to an
invasive pest, their idealized contexts leave little room for human error or an ecological
happenstance that turns an introduced species into an invasive one. The story of the Dutch elm
disease quarantine exemplifies the need to include such ambiguity into our understandings of
quarantine policy. Invasion ecologists acknowledge that each invasive species and the
management plans they require are unique, and to suggest a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model to
introduced pests is a fool’s errand. 72 Rather, by “amassing a catalog of case studies,” research
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can generalize the behavior of ecosystems and invasive species to “advance both theory and
practice.” 73 Case studies on the management of invasive species abound, but few focus on the
quarantine efforts themselves and even fewer focus on non-contemporary invasions or pests.
Environmental historians are thus in a position to add a wealth of knowledge to invasive
species and quarantine studies. Understanding biological exchange and the impact of
alien/invasive species is not a new topic in environmental history. 74 Recent work on the topic
builds on broader understandings of ecological exchange. 75 However, quarantine efforts are
often only passing references or literal footnotes to our analyses of the management of such
pests. 76 Broader analyses of management efforts to prevent the import and spread of pests and
disease mention quarantines as part of a broader management strategy, but do not focus on the
utility of such measures in and of themselves. 77 A shift in focus by environmental historians
from the species themselves to their management would not only provide practical
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understandings of management for policy makers but further develop our understandings of
those species’ distributions and their relationship to human decision making. By analyzing how
management strategies influenced the success or failure of such species to spread, environmental
historians could heed the call for deeper considerations of “the relationship between humans and
invasive species” which has previously been described “as an important and neglected theme
within American environmental historical geography.” 78
According to McCubbin and Strong, in 1936 there were 79 quarantines and regulatory
orders issued under the Plant Quarantine Act that affected international and interstate movement
of plants and associated materials. 79 Although some of these might not have as extensive
archival records as Dutch elm disease, several do. One prominent example that has already been
studied by environmental historians is white pine blister rust. 80 Another notable example is
Japanese beetle, given that although there are records of federal management going as far back
first decade of the twentieth century, we still struggle to control this pest today. Like Dutch elm
disease, these pests could provide insight into the historical development of pest management
and can aid contemporary efforts to control insects and plant diseases by ensuring new efforts do
not suffer from the same shortcomings as previous epidemics.
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Conclusion
Although quarantines are frequently a recommended inclusion in the management plans for
invasive pests, the recommendation almost always comes with the caveat that such policies are
rarely effective. In this examination of the quarantine policies put in place to prevent the import
and to control the spread of Dutch elm disease, I have demonstrated two of the primary reasons
for their being ineffective on a practical level. First, the fungus’ history demonstrates the
importance of proactive and extensive quarantines. Second, the disease and its vectors show the
importance of including all components of a disease matrix in quarantine policies. A wealth of
other historical cases of pest management exist in the archives of the Bureau of Entomology and
Plant Quarantine that could provide such practical tools for improving management of modern
forest pests. Environmental historians are well suited to accessing these archives to aid
contemporary management efforts in ensuring the policies they put into place today do not repeat
the shortcomings of the past that enabled Dutch elm disease to wipe out the once-beloved
American elm.
From a theoretical perspective, the quarantines to contain Dutch elm disease failed
because those writing the quarantine policies, especially the chief of the Bureau in charge of
approving and implementing the policies, believed such policies to be ineffectual against plant
diseases, and thus enabled such failures by writing a crippled policy. His beliefs were based on
the knowledge of some of the leading experts and the resulting quarantine was considered the
best management practice. However, although some supported Strong’s ideas, others vehemently
disagreed with how the final regulation was written. Unfortunately, those who were advocating
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for changes to the policy were not in the position to ensure those changes were made. It is
impossible to say whether or not Sheals’ quarantine would have been more effective at all, and if
so for how long. The discussions do, however, demonstrate the importance of not only
understanding the scientific basis of such policies, but the ideological framework that informs
that science. As climate change and globalization ensure the continued spread and introduction
of pests and pathogens like Dutch elm disease, it is crucial that managers are not only well
informed regarding best practices for limiting their impact, but how and why those practices
have come to be considered the best.
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Chapter 3: Attempts to Control the Spread of Dutch Elm Disease
Recently, urban foresters and geographers have turned their attention to the historical
contexts that have affected the age structure, species composition and ecosystem function of
trees in the city. 1 Urban forests, defined as all trees within a city regardless of ownership or
specific location in yards, parks or right of ways, are of interest to academics and the public as
the value these unique ecosystems and the services they provide become more widely
recognized. 2 Many urban forest researchers focus on contemporary correlations between urban
forest structure, land use, and socioeconomic conditions, a useful approach for identifying
current patterns of inequality of forest cover and the uneven distribution of ecosystem services. 3
However, there is evidence that tree cover in cities can be predicted by past conditions and
management decisions, due to the lag time between planting and maturation of trees. 4 While
biophysical factors such as climate and biome have a significant initial impact on what species
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will be present within a city, historical management decisions, including planting or removing
trees, as well as intervening against pests and disease, are also important determining factors of
urban forest landscapes. 5 Similarly, the limitations of those management decisions, including
where and when urban foresters can implement them, have a demonstrable effect on
contemporary urban forests. 6
One of the best examples of historical conditions affecting contemporary urban forests is
Dutch elm disease. The disease, a fungus transferred between trees by beetles and introduced
from Europe in 1930, threatened the 25 million elms that grew in United States cities in the early
twentieth century. 7 The importance of elms in cities led to a federally funded management
program aimed at eradicating the fungus and saving the elms. Although the disease is most
widely known for its effects in urban areas, this program managed both urban and rural elms to
reach its goals. In this paper, I use the management of Dutch elm disease in the United States as
a case study to better understand the effects of management decisions on contemporary urban
forests. As described by Campanella (2007), a confluence of biophysical, cultural and
management factors favored the elms’ initial popularity and led to their ubiquity in the American
urban landscape prior to the Dutch elm disease epidemic. For two decades, federal managers
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implemented multiple strategies to save the elms from the disease, but the program is frequently
overlooked because it ultimately failed to save the elms. The failure is often attributed to a lack
of funds, manpower and motivation. 8 Other discussions of Dutch elm disease focus on the
lessons learned in hindsight, with strong emphasis on the importance of planting a diverse urban
forest to prevent such epidemics in the future. 9 They focus on the idea that the ubiquity of elms
enabled the spread of the disease, and that by planting a more diverse urban forest such spread
would be limited, in addition to reducing the effect of a single species’ loss on the landscape.
However, I contend that the loss of elms to Dutch elm disease was not a biogeographic
inevitability. I use the records of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine (hereafter
referred to as “the Bureau”), the federal agency tasked with managing Dutch elm disease, to
reveal the complexity of the management program and the reasons for its failure. In this paper, I
show that rather than simply being a function of too many elms, the ultimate cause of the
widespread loss of urban elms was a decision-making process that was based in unreasonable
expectations, that was designed without the fungus’ ecology in mind, and that was not flexible
enough to appropriately incorporate scientific findings about the pathogen. Following a narrative
description of the management program, I analyze its failures and highlight how the story of
Dutch elm disease exemplifies our need to create management strategies that are flexible enough
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to incorporate new scientific discoveries. I conclude with a discussion of the utility of revisiting
histories of failure to more thoroughly understand and prevent future repetition of those failures.
Graphium’s Introduction and the Initial Management Plan, 1930 – 1934
While the first official discovery of Dutch elm disease in the United States was in Ohio in 1930,
its origin and spread remained a mystery until 1933. The fungus, then called Graphium ulmi
(now Ophiostoma ulmi), had initially been discovered and identified in Europe in the 1920’s. 10
Although quarantines developed by scientists at the Bureau, implemented by the USDA, and
enforced by the states had been put in place since the fungus’ initial identification, they only
forbade the importation of live elms, seeds and packing material. Logs shipped for use in the
furniture industry were required to undergo debarking and heat treatments to kill any beetles they
may have carried, but otherwise easily entered the country. These logs, destined to become
veneer at factories across the East Coast and Midwest, carried the fungus and its beetle vectors.
Due to non-compliance, the mandated treatments thought to kill the vectors were insufficient to
totally eliminate the fungus and beetles. By not completing the required tasks that would destroy
the disease in imported logs, shippers allowed the disease to enter and spread across the
country. 11 Isolated infections appeared scattershot around the country, in Ohio, Virginia, and
Maryland. They occurred most often near furniture and veneer factories, with discoveries of the
disease in Indianapolis, Indiana providing the strongest evidence for such a connection, given the
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proximity to the Hoosier Veneer Plant. 12 However, these isolated infections did little to stir
significant concern over Dutch elm disease, as they were not associated with sustained
epidemics. Once identified, diseased trees were quickly removed, and no further evidence of
disease presence was found nearby. It was not until the “extensive outbreak” discovered in June
1933 by scouts employed by the eradication project in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut
that a federal management plan was instituted and funded for the national control and eradication
of Dutch elm disease. 13
On December 5, 1934, officials from the Bureau held a public conference in Washington,
DC on the status of Dutch elm disease in the United States. The goal of the conference was to
inform the public on the previous four years’ work done to manage the isolated cases of the
fungus, and to announce the Bureau’s plans to use federal appropriations already secured from
Congress to “eradicate and remove” dead and dying elms to eliminate Dutch elm disease in the
United States. 14 With the objective of “immediate control and ultimate eradication of Dutch elm
disease,” a management strategy was developed and enacted to save the elms. At this time, there
was no known cure for the disease, and the plan was based on best known practices regarding the
elimination of the fungus and its vectors developed during the original outbreak in Europe in the
late 1910’s. 15 The fungus was spread between elm trees by elm bark beetles, who favored
Records of Isolated Infections enclosed in a memo from L. H. Worthley, In Charge, Dutch Elm Disease,
to Avery S. Hoyt, Assistant Chief of the Bureau, Washington, DC, Dec. 1, 1934; Dutch Elm Disease Control
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breeding in dying elms and feeding on healthy trees. This habit made the beetles especially
effective at spreading the fungus given that their offspring were more likely to emerge from an
infected tree and move on to a healthy elm, thus bringing the fungus to new hosts. When the
young beetles that were carrying the fungus fed on healthy trees, they created wounds through
which the fungus could enter the tree. The fungus could then take hold in the tree’s xylem,
blocking its ability to transport water, causing wilting, crown die back and eventually death. 16
With this fungus and vector lifecycle in mind, the Bureau’s elimination strategy had four
components: scouting, identification, eradication and sanitation. The first three were triage,
focused on finding and removing infected trees. Scouts in the field would identify elms with
symptoms of the fungus, tag them, and send a sample to the lab to confirm its disease status. If
the tree tested positive, a crew would return to the site for removal. Negative results meant a tree
remained standing. However, crews would return to check for infection regularly through the
season and in following years. Figure 3.1 shows the number of confirmed cases of Dutch elm
disease over time. Notable in the graph is the seasonality of confirmations. Scouting occurred in
the spring as new leaves emerged and began to wilt, and thus most new infections were found in
that season. Sanitation, on the other hand, was year-round and preventative. Crews removed trees
with more than 50% crown die back or other structural issues even if these trees tested negative
for the disease, and often without testing them at all. Because beetles prefer to breed in sickly
elms, but feed on healthy trees, removal of “devitalized” elms became a key precautionary
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measure enacted by the Bureau. All removed trees, infected or not, were burned so that they
could no longer harbor beetles or the fungus.
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Figure 3.1 Number of confirmed cases of Dutch elm disease from the main disease zone,
primarily the area centered around New York City, based on the weekly reports of the Bureau of
Entomology and Plant Quarantine. Based on weekly reports for 2/2/1935-12/2/1944, graph
created by author.
There were several benefits to the sanitation protocol. First, it removed breeding material
for the beetles, reducing their populations. Second, it removed potentially infectious material
without burdening the lab with thousands of samples. In March of 1935 the scout crews reported
350,000 devitalized elms across the 1,400-square mile ‘main disease zone’, the area surrounding
first infection found in New York City, a number demonstrating the impracticality of testing
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every potentially diseased tree. 17 Third, sanitation lessened the burden on scouting. Since these
trees were already sickly and were likely to get the infection eventually because they made ideal
beetle breeding sites, it made sense to simply remove them ahead of the infection and prevent the
need for frequent revisits to check for infection. This seemed especially prudent given that most
devitalized trees were low value saplings growing in swampy areas or otherwise rough terrain. 18
However, there were also drawbacks to the program. Because the majority of elm trees
removed by sanitation crews were of unknown disease status, it is difficult to know exactly how
many infectious trees were being removed. Potentially very few of the elms removed at this stage
actually harbored the fungus. Similarly, the work was focused on the main disease zone, and
isolated infections continued to occur in states not contiguous to the main disease zone, although
fortunately they did not become as severe (during this period) as the outbreak in New York,
Connecticut and New Jersey.
In addition to the fungus elimination fieldwork, a research program was created to
improve upon these practices. While the field crews remained hard at work cutting down
diseased and dying elms, Bureau scientists tested new methods for controlling and eradicating
Dutch elm disease. 19 These lines of experimentation were particularly important for their
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potential to increase the number of elms left standing, as the goal of the program was to eradicate
the disease to save the elms.
Outlook “better than fifty-fifty” 20: Successful control measures, 1935-1937
To aid the scientific arm of the project, a centrally located laboratory opened in Morristown, NJ
in 1935. A primary goal of this lab was culturing fungus from field samples to identify positive
cases – hence, it was often referred to as the identification lab. Scientists at the lab began
compiling reports that systemically assembled the notes and data of the field crews. The reports
contained short qualitative narratives of the previous week’s work, highlighting interesting
anecdotes from the field, discussions of what might have helped or hindered progress, and lists
of newfound sites of infection, especially those that expanded the area of the main disease zone.
Tabular data within the reports documented the progress of each component of the program by
state. Such numbers were frequently used to highlight the program’s successful elm removal, and
the relatively small number of infections. Isolated infections that were not in the main disease
zone, such as those in Cleveland and Cincinnati, were eventually lumped together as “Other” or
“Outside Areas,” though they were not added to the tabulations until 1936. These reports give a
precise timeline of the progress of the bureau’s work (some of the data from the reports are
summarized in Figure 3.1).
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The reports from the first year reflect the growing pains of a newly formalized program.
The prevalence of elms in densely built cities, and residents’ efforts to maintain the largest and
most fragile trees, led to some difficult removals. In New Jersey, a 27” diameter elm stood in a
courtyard between a number of offices. Eradication crews had to dismantle the elm carefully,
carry the pieces down a narrow hallway, and pass them through a window before taking them
away to be burned. 21 Another elm in New Jersey, this one 40” in diameter, had been filled with
concrete and scrap metal to stabilize the main trunk. Crews had to chisel the filled portion of the
trunk for hours before being able to adequately remove the infected tree. 22 When weather was
favorable, though, eradication crews in more rural settings compensated for the slow work in the
cities and villages. Frozen over swamps allowed easy access to the difficult terrain where socalled brush elms, or wild growing trees in forested areas, required removal as part of sanitation
measures. In the March 1934 request for continued appropriations, L.H. Worthley, chief of the
project, noted that success remained likely due to the “high interest and determined efforts of the
workers and their willingness to stick to the job.” 23 Rainy weather in April allowed for a focus
on training the removal crews to scout for diseased trees. Despite difficulties documented in the
weekly scouting reports, he reiterated his optimism around the project in a statement from the
December 1934 conference that “a sustained program involving adequate scouting and
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eradication … will, we believe, result in [the disease’s] ultimate eradication,”. 24 By the end of
1935, field crews had removed over 14,000 infected elms and an additional 841,000 devitalized
elms from the main disease zone. Notably, the reports do not specify where in the main disease
zone these removals were concentrated. While Dutch elm disease is well known for afflicting the
urban forest, it is important to note that the impressive numbers of removed trees were largely
attained by clearcutting rural elm stands, especially in swampy areas. For example, New Jersey
crews felled 14,199 dead or dying elms the week of December 7, 1935. The total number of elms
removed that week was tallied at 15,199 – thus 93% of trees removed were from clearcutting
swampy areas. 25
While the crews were busy removing trees, Bureau scientists were looking for ways to
make the process more efficient. 26 One of their priorities, chemical treatments, was showing
promise. By applying copper sulphate, zinc chloride or mercury, the Bureau’s research team had
been able to prevent infestation and infection of stumps left behind by the eradication crews. If
such a process could be used to kill fully grown devitalized elms, sanitation could be more
efficient, because the beetles would have nowhere to breed. Before chemical silvicide, crews
needed to cut down and burn devitalized elms immediately upon finding them in order to prevent
potentially infested materials from remaining and harboring infection. A chemical solution

Worthley, 1934; DED Control Corr.; RG7; RM-KC.
Report for the Week Ending December 7, 1935; Dutch Elm Disease Project Files 1935-1950; Records of
the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, 1863 – 1956, Record Group 7; National Archives and Records
Administration - Kansas City.
26
Report for the Week Ending December 28, 1935; Dutch Elm Disease Project Files 1935-1950; Records
of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, 1863 – 1956, Record Group 7; National Archives and Records
Administration - Kansas City.
24
25

71

would enable the crews instead to treat the trees to prevent infestation, rendering them noninfectious. Even if the standing trees contained the fungus, no vector would be able colonize
them, rendering the fungus non-contagious. They could then return when conditions were more
favorable for removal and burning of the dead trees. This was particularly important because the
burning of downed trees was often slowed by adverse conditions like rain and wind, so that the
trees would literally pile up and provide breeding material for the beetles. 27 The efficacy of
chemical treatments was accepted as proven by the end of 1936, although it was still unclear
whether the chemicals were fully incorporated into the trees’ crowns within a few months of
treatment, which was necessary to prevent leaving breeding material for beetles in the highest
branches. Management officials, however, were confident in their scientists’ assumption that the
chemical would eventually kill all of the branches -- and the beetles within them -- before they
had time to emerge, eliminating the risk. Though this meant potentially leaving the unaffected
portions of the tree available for beetle attack if their assumption was incorrect, the apparent
increased efficiency in sanitation was irresistible. 28 In the last week of December 1936, while
sanitation crews eliminated 24,208 elms through their normal activities, they treated an
additional 18,550 elms with copper sulphate, increasing their productivity by 75%. 29
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Other technological advancements were gradually adopted. Using autogiros, a sort of
two-man helicopter-glider (Figure 3.2), scouts could look for symptomatic elms from above.
Ground crews could then navigate to the area to further investigate the suspect trees. Autogiro
crews focused on difficult terrain, like swamps or mountainous regions, as well as on delineating
areas without elms so that scouts would not waste their time looking for devitalized and infected
elms where none grew. Not only did this speed up the scouting process, it also made it safer.
Safety became a priority after an incident in October 1935, when a scout searching for elms at
high elevation near the Bear Mountain Bridge in Westchester County slipped and fell to his
death. The report on the accident blamed early frosts that had led to particularly slippery
conditions. As this followed a summer of scouts having near misses with copperhead snakes
among other dangers, a safer method of scouting was a welcome safety precaution. 30 Again,
these anecdotes and the use of autogiros highlight the importance of rural elm management in the
program.
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Figure 3.2 A photograph of the autogiros used in aerial scouting operations. From the National
Archives in Kansas City, MO.
Not all experiments were welcome. One researcher proposed an experiment in which
infected elms would be pruned instead of removed completely. If successful, pruning would be
implemented in urban areas while clearcutting and silvicide was used in rural areas. This would
allow residents to continue enjoying the presence of high value urban elm trees. Many villages
had elms that were particularly large and beloved, and cities would frequently mark certain elms
as historically significant because of their size, age or connection to past visits by important
political figures. Pruning elms with small, localized infections early enough would hopefully
save the elm from complete elimination, thus preserving the historically significant trees but also
removing the infectious branches. However, there was concern that pruning experiments would
be viewed as a change in the program, and the public would simply prune their elms rather than
submitting samples for culturing and identification of fungal presence. There was also concern
that residents would be angry if the pruning experiment failed and were asked to destroy pruned
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trees despite the perceived potential to save their tree. In response to a memo outlining the
proposed pruning experiment, an unnamed official responded,
“We are eradicating the disease by the only known methods and while the operation may
be painful it would seem advisable to follow it until evidence is available as to justified
[sic] change in program. I see the point of view of the research man and the property owner.
To the first I would say if this research is necessary go elsewhere (Europe) to do it. To the
second I would say we are treating all alike for a common good.” 31
While the comment above focuses on how the experiment might be confusing to the public, it
also shows the commitment to eradication over control. Not only would public interest in the
program likely inspire requests by property owners for inclusion in the experiment regardless of
their scientific utility, but officials worried about misinterpretation of the experiment as a change
in program. Officials thought that the public might see the pruning as a switch in policy, leading
them away from reporting infected trees in favor of pruning the trees themselves, making
eradication of the disease impossible. 32 The suggestion for pruning was ignored for several
years, until the potential ineffectiveness of the program writ large and the number of urban elms
being removed became a bigger concern for officials and the public nearly a decade after the
initial proposal.
Aside from this debate, the program’s leaders were optimistic and touted their success. In
January of 1936, the Bureau reported that field crews had removed over 1.1 million elms through
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sanitation and eradication efforts. 33 Only just over fourteen thousand of those trees had actually
been infected – evidence to the Bureau that sanitation was effectively eradicating the disease
(albeit evidence as well of the many healthy elms being destroyed). In March of 1936 the
program purchased an autogiro exclusively for use in Dutch elm disease scouting. By the end of
the summer, they had purchased three additional work trucks, a second autogiro, and four newlyinvented power-saws. The power saws were able to remove large trees in 6-8 hours, a task which
require 2-3 days work from an entire hand crew. 34 Allotments from federal and state funds
allowed the Bureau to hire nearly seven times as many scouts as the previous summer. Dr. Lee
Strong, chief of the Bureau, was cautiously confident in the project’s progress, claiming that the
odds of success were “better than fifty-fifty” if residents complied with the necessary removal of
dead and dying elms, and aided in the scouting efforts by sending samples themselves, and that
“America need not despair” and give up on the project like those attempting to save elms in
Europe. 35
The optimistic outlook continued despite changes in leadership and delays in budget
appropriations. In June of 1937, project chief Worthley became ill, and E.G. Brewer became
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acting chief of the program. 36 Despite difficulties in staffing and paying the field crews, by
August scouts had found 38% fewer Graphium trees in New York, and 21% fewer in New Jersey
than the previous scouting seasons, even though they were sending more samples to the lab.
Scouting the rail lines along which elm logs had travelled between ports and veneer plants was
going smoothly, with the help of the autogiros. Though most expeditions had found no
Graphium, the work effectively demonstrated that while the shipped wood might be leading to
the localized infections away from the disease zone, it was not causing significant problems in
the rural areas in between them. 37 Autogiro scouting of the railways only led to the discovery of
one new outside infection site in Athens, OH, located along the main line of the B&O railroad. 38
Unfortunately for Brewer, the tides turned for the worse after he became the chief of the
project. In October of 1937, Worthley passed away, and Brewer officially took his place. 39 Later
that same month, researchers discovered that Graphium could transfer among elms via natural
root grafts. This presented two major problems. First, there was no method of treating or
preventing such root grafts. Second, the evidence of infection appeared in the large, main
branches of the elms as opposed to the thin ends that scouts had been trained to sample from to
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confirm infection. Though certain situations called for trunk samples, it was not standard
protocol. 40 That December, scientists working for the Bureau announced they had been wrong
about the utility of copper sulphate in silviciding devitalized elms. Not only did chemical
treatments fail to completely kill the elms, but the treated trees had been attracting and
incubating large populations several species of elm bark beetles. Although only 20% of the
beetles sampled from chemically silvicided trees were carrying the fungus, the population boom
enabled by the increased breeding material was a major concern for the eradication project. 41
There was also evidence that long after trees fell, woodpiles and downed logs were also capable
of harboring not only the beetles, but viable fungus as well. 42 The nearly 700,000 treated trees
standing in the main disease zone were now an significant and obvious risk to the success of the
program, and as the scientist reporting the situation stated, such a situation was apt to cause
“adverse criticism” of the program and the department. 43
In short, the scientific advancements in chemical pesticides and aerial identification of
diseased trees made officials at the Bureau optimistic about the program. During these early
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years of the project, field crews were able to develop a seasonal rhythm of scouting, laboratory
identification, and tree removal that seemed to effectively decrease the number of sick trees
reported each week. Bureaucratic hiccups like changes in leadership did little to stymie
fieldwork, and sanitation efforts continued to remove potentially infected materials. However,
the optimism stood in contrast to very real hardships brought on by new understandings of
disease transfer and the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the now widespread chemical
treatments that had earlier buoyed the spirits of those running the project.
“Every diseased elm must be destroyed,” 1938-1942 44
In March of 1938, a press release announced a shift in the project’s protocol to account for a
“new danger” discovered by the pathologists in the field. 45 Due to a series of
miscommunications regarding the removal of experimentally inoculated trees, scientists at the
Morristown lab discovered that elms infected with the fungus could survive for many years
without showing any symptoms of the disease or succumbing to the infection. 46 As long as the
fungus was not exposed via broken branches, these elms could remain healthy and posed no
threat to surrounding trees. However, this meant that the usual methods of scouting by looking
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for symptoms was completely ineffective. 47 On the one hand this was a promising discovery:
Dutch elm disease was no longer a death sentence for the millions of elms across the country. On
the other, it meant the program to eliminate the fungus now had a near-impossible task. How
could they eradicate the fungus if they could not find it? Rather than sparking hope that elms
could survive despite the epidemic, these latent infections led to fear that the program would
never be successful in the goal of eradication. But instead of adjusting the goal of the program to
account for this new information, project managers doubled down on eradicating the fungus,
stating, “We believe eradication is still possible, the objective of our work should still be
eradication.” 48
While maintaining a goal of eradication, the program’s managers reprioritized certain
activities. The original components – scouting, identification, eradication and sanitation – were
still the primary methods of management, but now they were to be employed more strategically
across the infected area around New York City and the adjacent counties. Scouting remained a
priority on the boundary of the infected zone such that managers could determine if the fungus
was spreading. Rigorous scouting in the core of the infected area, however, stopped. Valuable
trees were to be examined thoroughly and only removed if infected, but most scouting would be
done from autogiros to identify symptomatic elms from above. The “main effort of the program”
turned to removal of all elms from the interior ten-mile boundary of the infected zone. Once that
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area had been made “completely elm free,” crews would work inward into the main disease area,
expanding sanitation into the center of the disease zone. Because the process of using copper
sulfate as a silvicide had proven to be ineffective, and even encouraged growth of the beetle
population, this sanitation work would be primarily done through clearcutting all elms
encountered in these zones. 49 In essence, the program’s new goal was to eradicate the fungus in
the main disease zone by eliminating nearly all of the elms in that area. Sanitation protocols
would be enforced on all but the most highly valued urban elm trees.
Although the distribution of the field work had changed, in practice it remained the same.
Crews continued to report the usual oddities, such as large tree removals and reluctant property
owners. One report highlighted the cultural importance of elm trees by recounting the story of a
woman fainting when she discovered her husband had approved of crews removing their elm. 50
Men in rural and swampy areas sent more bizarre anecdotes, like a crew in Connecticut who
found skeletons in the woods, and another in New Jersey that had been chased by a “knife
wielding maniac” who had escaped a nearby prison. 51 The reports also highlighted the difficulty
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of working in the field. In addition to the usual threats of snake bites, one crew foreman had been
struck by lightning. 52
Weather became the biggest barrier to completing the field work. It was crucial to burn
the downed elms, given that wood piles were now a known contributor to beetle populations and
fungus, but operations were constrained to ideal conditions. Dry, windy conditions meant crews
could not burn the downed elms for fear of the fires getting out of hand. Too much precipitation
meant the fires would not start at all. Fears of potentially virulent log piles led to concern from
program managers, but the delays rarely lasted long, and crews were eventually able to burn the
accumulated elm wood. Most importantly, the number of infections remained stable throughout
the summer of 1938. 53 This success despite unpredictable weather that summer may have led to
the apparent nonchalance regarding the 1938 New England Hurricane. The weekly report for the
last week of September notes,
“Field activities in most localities were retarded this week on account of the stormy
weather. …Thousands of trees were blown down and many homes were demolished due
to the high velocity of the wind. …Field operations in New York were hindered due to
above-mentioned weather conditions.” 54
A survey in Connecticut found that nearly 20% of all hurricane-damaged trees were elms, with
41% being ornamental trees in cities – those trees that the new strategy had been most keen on
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protecting. 55 The earlier concern over delayed burning of wood piles paled in comparison to the
massive clean-up effort that crews now needed to commence in order to prevent potentially
infected wood and beetle breeding material from remaining in the area. Additionally, logs that
had been awaiting burning had, in some cases, been stacked near rivers that had flooded during
the storm. These logs were now floating down river, with the potential of spreading the disease
outside of the main disease area. The sanitation effort was now operating at maximum capacity,
but the hurricane clean-up would not be completed until a full year after the storm. 56 Even elms
that remained standing still posed a problem for the project. High winds from the storm had
removed their leaves, which normally displayed the most visible outward symptom of the disease
by wilting. Scouting season was thus cut short, potentially leaving infected trees not only
standing, but unmarked.
Almost exactly one year following the hurricane, a conference was held to discuss the
accomplishments of the Dutch elm disease project, and what it should look like moving forward.
Officials from the Division of Forest Insects, the Division of Forest Pathology, and the Bureau of
Plant Industry, all from the USDA, in addition to officials from state agencies in Indiana,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, attended the meeting hosted by the
Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine. An extensive report on the conference sent to Dr.
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Strong detailed the conversations that occurred there. 57 Mr. Brewer outlined the program’s
objectives, highlighting the shift to more strategic application of identification, eradication and
sanitation efforts proposed in 1938, described above, as well as discussing application of the new
scouting efforts more specifically. So-called “advance surveys” were tracking the spread of the
fungus up to 100 miles from the center of the main disease zone, and scouts were investigating
the health and location of elm populations as far as 150-miles from the center of the main disease
zone. The additional area, nearly two thousand square miles, meant 1939 was the most intensive
scouting season to date with nearly seventy thousand suspected disease samples sent to the lab,
however the number of new confirmed cases decreased from the previous year. 58
Despite the improved numbers, the report detailed the first evidence that not everyone
involved in the program was as optimistic as the weekly reports and internal memos of the
Bureau suggested. Attendees expressed concern over the continued growth of the area under
scrutiny by the program, especially given that the advance survey was finding infections that
expanded the disease zone. If the federal program ended, they argued, there would be no elms
left to benefit from the research on improved methods of sanitation and eradication. However,
there was little agreement on how to move forward with the scientific agenda of the project.
Plant pathologists argued it was up to entomologists to determine better ways of controlling the
vector. Entomologists suggested plant pathologists needed to determine a solution to the problem
of latent infections. Officials for the program refused to allow pruning experiments that would
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allow elms, infected or otherwise, to remain standing. 59 The delegate from Connecticut pointed
out that, “if we cannot eradicate the Dutch elm disease fungus, the day will come when we must
give up,” and indeed seemed eager to end the federal program in favor of local efforts. 60 Mr.
Brewer, however, pointed to the success in controlling the outlying infections in Ohio and
Indiana as examples of the program’s potential success. The conference concluded with the
program receiving support from the attendees, and the management protocol was left unchanged.
In 1940, the Bureau’s chief entomologist, Dr. Craighead, published a report documenting
the progress of the scientific studies of the program up until that point. 61 He noted the
impossibility of finding every infected tree due to the nature of the latent infections discovered in
1938. Additionally, the vectors’ preference for dead or dying elm wood, and the fact that the
fungus was viable in dead wood, meant that not only did they need to remove infected trees but
every trace of elm material. This meant intense work in the disease zone and advance scouting
areas, including an area of over ten thousand square miles and thirty-five thousand linear miles
along roads and railways in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Massachusetts, West Virginia, Ohio and Indianapolis. 62 He concluded that after two decades and
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over $23 million ($420 million in 2020 USD) 63 dollars spent on eradication there was a
“practical impossibility of eradicating the disease unless all elms are destroyed in the diseased
areas,” and suggested the project shift focus to controlling the disease within the area to protect
high value elms and prevent it’s further spread. In light of this information, it seemed the only
practical way forward was a control program that included pruning as a component. The plan to
do so was supported by the assistant chief of the bureau, the chief of the program, and the
program’s plant pathologist. 64 Dr. Strong, the chief of the Bureau, however, remained committed
to an eradication program and vehemently refused to allow pruning to be incorporated into
management of Dutch elm disease. 65
In June of 1941, Dr. Strong passed away, removing the only barrier to the inclusion of
pruning to the management program. 66 His successor, Dr. P.N. Annand, facing budgetary
challenges as the U.S. entered World War II, shifted the goal of the program from eradication to
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control in order to allow pruning. 67 The change was “essential in an effort to bring objective,
funds, and man-power into harmony…” 68 While the reduction in funds affected the amount of
work that could be done in the major disease area, allowing pruning in place of extermination
mitigated the mismatch of objective and funds. The bigger concern was staffing the field crews.
Field crews were primarily staffed by young men through the Works Progress Administration
(WPA) and the Civilian Conservation Corps. Wartime projects for these groups, such as
recycling steel from abandoned railways, were prioritized over filling the control program’s field
crews. Some men trained by the Dutch elm disease project were able to find more gainful
employment as the field of professional tree-care grew. Additionally, many of the young men
eligible for the field crews opted out of working with these programs at all by joining the
military. 69 In some cases, this meant that areas that were normally covered by crews of fifteen
men were now being covered by pairs or even single scouts. Though women had not been
considered capable of doing field work in the past, the lack of man-power led the leaders to turn
to women for the scouting effort. Much to their surprise, the female crews made “remarkably fast
progress” through scout training, and except for additional exercise for tree climbing needed no
extra help beyond what was given to male trainees. 70

E.G. Brewer, In Charge, Japanese Beetle Control to P.N. Annand, Chief of the Bureau, June 11, 1942;
Dutch Elm Disease Control Correspondence; Records of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, 1863 –
1956, Record Group 7; National Archives at Kansas City.
68
"Program during Emergency" 1942; Control Corr.; RG7; RM-KC.
69
Jonnes, Urban Forests: A Natural History of Trees and People in the American Cityscape.
70
Report for the Week Ending May 1, 1943; Dutch Elm Disease Project Files 1935-1950; Records of the
Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, 1863 – 1956, Record Group 7; National Archives and Records
Administration - Kansas City.; Report for the Week Ending May 8, 1943; Dutch Elm Disease Project Files 19351950; Records of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, 1863 – 1956, Record Group 7; National Archives
and Records Administration - Kansas City.
67

87

Increased spread and decreased power: A slow decline from 1943 onward
In addition to the challenge of maintaining field crews, 1943 brought an insurmountable
challenge for the program. While previous years had seen high appropriations for the project
from the WPA, federal appropriations, and cooperating states (Figure 3.3), the House Budget
Committee slashed funding for the control program in 1943. Asserting that paying for removal of
trees on private property was an inappropriate use of funds, the Committee reduced federal
appropriations to $333,330, an 85% decrease from the previous year’s allocations. 71 Crucially,
the laws around access to private property had not changed. Federal programs were still allowed
to enter private property and remove trees if they deemed it necessary. However, the budget cut
meant the program could no longer afford to do so, as they were legally required to pay for the
removal. These constraints meant that they could only enter private property and suggest the
owner take action. The appropriations bill called for the affected states to enact police powers
that would give them the authority to access and remove trees from private property, but left the
states to fund the process themselves. 72 Up until this point, though the states involved had been
asked to enact such legislation, the presence of the federal project meant they had had no impetus
to do so. Following the budget cuts, however, they needed to finally follow through on the
suggestion or give up hope of saving their elms. This caused concern among the control program

71
Avery Hoyt, Acting Chief of the Bureau, to Charles Dawson, Commissioner of Agriculture, Indianapolis,
Indiana, July 27, 1943 (Hoyt to Dawson, 1943); Dutch Elm Disease Control Correspondence (Control Corr.);
Records of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, 1863 – 1956, Record Group 7 (RG7); National
Archives at Kansas City (RM-KC)., "Program during Emergency" 1942; Control Corr.; RG7; RM-KC.
72
Hoyt to Dawson, 1943, Control Corr.; RG7; RM-KC.

88

officials, given that states had been wary of committing funds to the project. Of the funds spent
until this point, less than 7% had come from all the states involved, combined. 73
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Figure 3.3 Bars represent the amount of appropriations for the Dutch elm disease eradication
project per year in millions. The percent of the previous year’s appropriations shown by the line
demonstrates that funding was fairly stable from 1938-1942, until the project was abruptly
underfunded in 1943.
The shift in responsibility led the bureau leaders to hold a conference with state agencies
involved with the program. 74 Ten states were directly affected by the change, given that this
meant an end to the removal of diseased and beetle infested material within their jurisdictions.
These states included Connecticut, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
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Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. However, bureau leaders were eager to point
out that the absence of federal management activity within those states did not mean they were
not threatened by the disease. Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee,
Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont were also alerted to the importance of
maintaining contact with the bureau’s scouting program, as they were adjacent to infected areas,
or included railroads suspected of spreading the disease. 75 While the program leaders gave them
as much information as possible, and continued with the scouting program as described below,
eradication efforts were henceforth left to the discretion of each state. Scouting, maintaining the
laboratory in charge of identifying infected specimens, and research regarding the disease
became the focus of the small budget remaining for the eradication and control program. 76
The lack of appropriations and the shift toward state control began a slow spiral toward
an end of the federal management program. A number of additional issues would continue to
derail the project. A viral disease affecting elms in the Ohio Valley distracted from interest in
Dutch elm disease. Although the disease, known as elm phloem necrosis, had been evident since
1918, an epidemic in the area, and mystery surrounding its provenance, method of spread, and
lack of a cure distracted from the Dutch elm disease project. 77 Not only was the public in this
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region now more concerned with the virus, viral infections were causing difficulty in identifying
trees with the fungus. Scouts were reporting increased numbers of sick trees; however, it was not
always because of Dutch elm disease. 78 Similarly, the Dutch elm disease research program was
now given double duty – not only were they expected to continue researching more productive
ways of managing the fungus on a shoestring budget, they also were tasked with better
understanding the virus, especially any connection it might have with the fungus. 79
The domestic quarantine to prevent the spread of Dutch elm disease, originally enacted
1935, and last updated in 1941, was lifted in May of 1947, due to its apparent ineffectiveness. 80
Again, state governments concerned about their elms would need to take the task into their own
hands and enact internal quarantines against movement of elm wood, as well as provide the
funding to enforce them. Given the states’ continued disinterest in funding elm removal, the
lifting of the domestic quarantine functionally enabled Dutch elm disease to be spread
throughout the remaining unaffected states. A notable exception to this was California. The
fungus had yet to cross the Rocky Mountains, and California was the first of the west coast states
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to create strict restrictions on the movement of elm wood to protect their planted elms. 81 Shortly
after the quarantine was lifted, every state in which the federal program was operating received a
memo from Brewer stating that “it is necessary to suspend all phases of…work in your state at
the end of the work day on May 30, 1947…”. 82 This was done in concert with the “possible
liquidation of most project activities on June 30,”. 83 In a follow up memo, every state involved
was informed that scouting would no longer take place as part of the federal control program. 84
Bureau-funded research continued, with a focus on finding resistant cultivars of elms and
using pesticides to control the vectors, though appropriations continued to decline through
1949. 85 In 1952, the identification laboratory in Morristown, New Jersey, where samples were
tested for the fungus, was closed. Those interested in determining whether sick elms had Dutch
elm disease now had to send samples to their state laboratories (where they existed). 86 Although
the fungus continued to spread, there was no longer a federal program for the states to defer to.
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For many states, this meant relying on past literature released by the program or basing their
management on recommendations on the knowledge of their own pathologists and
entomologists. Control of the fungus became completely decentralized, and the task of saving the
elms was now regarded as a “local struggle” as it continued to spread to new townships, cities
and states. 87
Discussion
The story of the attempted management of Dutch elm disease presented above is more complex
than modern descriptions generally give it credit for. The combination of unrealistic expectations
and an inability to adequately incorporate scientific findings into the management program
worked in concert to ensure that the federally funded Dutch elm disease program would fail. It is
worth noting specific contributors to that failure.
First, the original goal of the Dutch elm disease management program was based in
unrealistic expectations. Upon initial discovery of the disease, complete eradication seemed
plausible, as the incidental infections across the Midwest were readily eliminated. However,
once the large area of infection around New York City was discovered, complete eradication
became a more difficult challenge. From the outset, complete eradication was difficult because
infections could only be identified seasonally (when leaves were present) and required laboratory
confirmation. For a significant part of each year, it became difficult to locate infected trees. Even
during the scouting season, all suspected infections needed to be confirmed by laboratory culture
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– a process that in itself took time, both in the lab and in the time spent mailing samples and
awaiting the reports. At the beginning of the control program, Worthley noted that it took an
average of ten days for a sample from the field to be sent to the lab, cultured, identified as
diseased, and the tree slated for removal. 88 It is likely that as the control program grew both in
area and in number of samples received, that this average time increased – though the average
time was not again mentioned. Similarly, once it was discovered that trees could carry the fungus
without showing symptoms as “latent infections,” eradication based on the identification scheme
previously created by the Bureau was impossible. There was no way to guarantee that trees
without symptoms were not infected. At this point, eradication should have been removed as a
goal, but the Bureau’s chief chose instead to double down on his commitment to eradicating the
fungus.
This commitment to eradication was the driving force that caused the program to take
action that actively hindered its progress toward either eradication or control of the disease. As
demonstrated by the turn to chemical silvicide, the program was blinded by the focus on
increasing the efficiency of sanitation, in order to increase the likelihood of eradication. Notably,
silvicide only needed to be an option under a plan for complete eradication. Interest in more
efficiently killing and enabling the removal of low value, rural trees would not have been a
priority had eradication not been the main goal. Without the goal of eradication, these rural
stands would only have been of note had they been showing symptoms of the disease or actively
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harboring beetle populations, presenting a threat to nearby elms that were not infected. Under
eradication, even the potential of having the fungus meant these rural stands needed to be
eliminated. The program of silvicide backfired. Instead of removing the potential threat that rural
elms presented, the process contributed to these trees actually becoming the threat that the
program was trying to avoid. By only partially killing elms, the silvicide increased the amount of
beetle breeding sites, and allowed for a boom in the vector population. The quest for efficiency
outweighed the potentially hazardous effects of incorporating the technique into the management
program before fully understanding its effectiveness and the potential negative outcomes.
The commitment to eradication was similarly the driving force behind the project’s
second reason for failure - inability to shift strategies to adequately incorporate scientific
findings into the management program. Such was the case with pruning. Although a promising
method of maintaining elm trees regardless of the presence of the fungus, it was not considered
viable because it did not guarantee eradication of the fungus in the United States. Pruning as a
control strategy would have become crucial to saving elms after the discovery of latent
infections. The fact that elms could harbor the fungus without showing symptoms meant that
eradication was a functional impossibility. Similarly, the fungus’ ability to transfer between trees
via roots virtually guaranteed the disease would spread regardless of sanitation measures used to
control beetle populations. Beginning in 1938, managers of the program knew accomplishing the
goal of eradicating Dutch elm disease was impossible. However, they did not address the
disparity between the reality of how the fungus worked and the goals of the program for three
years after the initial discovery of that disparity. During that time, instead of shifting goals to
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address the new information, Dr. Strong insisted every diseased tree be destroyed. Because they
could not readily identify which were diseased, this meant the program leaned heavily toward
destroying every potentially diseased tree. And because every elm was potentially carrying the
fungus, the protocol thus called for the destruction of all elms in the main disease zone.
The eventual shift to control and the incorporation of pruning into the protocol after Dr.
Strong’s death demonstrate the importance of the opinions of individuals in positions of
administrative authority. It is not clear why Dr. Strong was so committed to eradication during
his tenure as chief of the bureau, and why he and some of his contemporaries so vehemently
refused pruning even as an experimental exercise. However, the consequences of his opinions
are clear. While Dutch elm disease is still potentially deadly to trees, and very likely would have
wiped out some stands of elms where adequate pruning and sanitation were not taking place, the
story outlined above calls into question how much of the elm loss was due to the epidemic, and
how much was due to the management decisions that were made to combat it. Indeed, had the
program been better funded and better able to staff its field crews, it seems likely that the entire
area in the jurisdiction of the program would have lost all of its elms to the field crews’ saws,
whether diseased or not.
Conclusion
The story of Dutch elm disease and its effect on modern urban landscapes is more complex than
the academic literature on the subject suggests. The spread of the fungus is not only a cautionary
tale against single-species planting. It more generally demonstrates the importance of developing
thorough understanding of the pests being managed and ensuring that the understanding are
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incorporated into management strategies. This requires the flexibility to shift goals of
management programs when knowledge of a pest changes, which in turn requires that those
making decisions around such programs are flexible as well. We should be willing but cautious
when incorporating scientific discoveries into management programs, especially before their
potential impacts are fully understood. We must also understand the necessity of shifting goals
and protocols when the scientific evidence irrefutably demonstrates the infeasibility of a goal’s
success. It is not a failure to understand the goal of a management program must change.
However, as shown with Dutch elm disease, remaining steadfast in a program regardless of
changing scientific understandings of the pest will lead to failure.
In addition to these lessons, the case study of Dutch elm disease highlights the
importance of revisiting failed attempts at management of pests and invasive species. This
examination of the history of the federal program to eradicate and control of the fungus not only
allows for a more thorough understanding of the project itself, but also suggests new lessons
beyond the assumptions regarding funding and manpower made in the immediate aftermath of
the program’s end. Similarly, this paper demonstrates that significant ecological complexities are
incorporated into management protocols through the lens of human decision-making processes
that are similarly important and complex. While the lesson of diversification to prevent
epidemics seems straightforward, we must also consider how varied modes of transmission
might affect its efficacy. More important, we must recognize where and why managers might be
incorporating such lessons into their protocols in order to understand their effect on the
landscape today.
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Chapter 4: Using the commons to understand the Dutch Elm Disease epidemic in Syracuse,
NY 1
In the early twentieth century, American elm (Ulmus americana) had become one of the
most popular urban trees in the United States. Valued for their shade and resistance to urban
hardships, elms were planted along streets, in parks and on private property in an “almost
unbroken chain across both New England and the continent” (Campanella 2007, 3). Although the
monocrop was countrywide, including cities in the Midwest, California and even Texas, the elms
thrived most successfully in the Northeast, where ideal climate conditions allowed them to
flourish. Despite the elms’ beauty, their ubiquity in metropolitan landscapes would ultimately be
their downfall. In 1931, Dutch elm disease, Ophiostoma ulmi, was found in New York City. The
fungus, originating from Europe and carried by both native and introduced elm bark beetles,
easily spread across the nation’s neatly planted rows of elms (Campanella 2007). By 1951, the
disease had reached such epidemic proportions that the federal government halted funding for
the program tasked with preventing the disease’s further spread because they deemed such a task
infeasible. (Hoyt 1951).
The loss of elms across the country seemed inevitable, though some still hoped to save
them. Foresters continued studying the fungus’ biology and the lifecycles of its vectors to
improve management techniques. They sought new methods of management, including the use
of fungicides, pesticides, and even biological control (Sinclair, Station, and Campana 1978;
Kondo, Hiratsuka, and Denyer 1981). In many cities, such advances in management techniques
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helped to slow the decline of elm populations for lengthy periods of time. However, commitment
to these new techniques eventually faltered and with few exceptions, millions of elms were lost
in cities across the United States.
In this paper I argue that elms and their pests are viewed as components of the urban
commons but understanding them as such does not align with what strategies managers are able
to enact in the patchwork of property ownership that occurs in cities. This misalignment of views
and practice was a fundamental component in the loss of elms in Syracuse, New York. Using
newspaper articles regarding the city’s management of the disease curated by the Onondaga
Historical Association and online newspaper databases, this paper explores the management of
Dutch elm disease in Syracuse to better understand the failings of past pest management to
inform contemporary urban forest management strategies. While most urban forest research
highlights the effects of the single species population on the epidemic, few investigate the
management of the disease itself. In other contexts, contemporary urban forestry research does
highlight the importance of how people understand and value the urban forest and its effects on
the structure of the forest. This paper further justifies the importance of such work by
highlighting the consequences of inadequate understanding of property owners’ willingness to
participate in management.
Syracuse provides a useful case study because of its generalizability and lack of
confounding factors. According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s data on Metropolitan Statistical
Areas, Syracuse and its surroundings are almost exactly average in terms of land area and
population (US Census Bureau 2012). This makes Syracuse more useful in comparative studies
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than traditionally studied cities, like New York or Boston, that are quite exceptional in these
regards. Unlike such densely populated cities, Syracuse has large swaths of natural landscapes in
the form of yards that allow for trees to grow on private property in addition to publicly
maintained parks and right of ways, leading to the management difficulties outlined below.
Similarly, the story of managing the fungus in Syracuse lacks confounding variables. That is,
because the fungus arrived in Syracuse after the federal program had ended, and because the city
focused on only one management technique, the connection between the commons and urban
tree management is clear.
Although a historical case, Dutch elm disease provides insight into urban tree
management that is crucial in light of recent pests such as Emerald Ash Borer and others that
currently threaten urban canopies (Herms and McCullough 2014). The paper begins with a brief
introduction to literature on the commons in order to provide a framework for understanding the
effects of Dutch elm disease at local scales. This is followed by an explanation of how the fungus
arrived and was managed in Syracuse. A discussion of the case study’s implications for urban
forest management and research is then concluded with recommendations for incorporating ideas
of the commons into urban forest management.
The commons as a framework for understanding Dutch elm disease
Tree experts frequently use Dutch elm disease as a cautionary tale against monocultures
in urban forests. Researchers have concluded that the ubiquity of elm plantings in the United
States allowed the fungus and beetles to run ram- pant and destroy elm populations due to a
constant source of breeding material (Raupp, Cumming, and Raupp 2006; Berland and Elliott
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2014). While it is true the high proportion of elm plantings in the United States cities was a
major culprit in the disease’s spread and effect, simply blaming the large elm population ignores
the effects of management decisions that followed the disease’s arrival. It does not explain why
some cities could adequately reduce the loss of elm trees to the disease, at lease for a brief
period, while others faltered and rapidly lost thousands of trees. Therefore, it is important to
understand not only how the elms’ biogeography contributed to their downfall, as has previously
been studied, but how the trees were understood and managed as a resource by those tasked with
saving them. Doing so will demonstrate how their actions may have exacerbated the epidemic in
some places but not others.
In this context, elms (and urban forests more broadly) can be considered part of the urban
commons. Historically, the commons referred to inert spaces, such as an agricultural field or
grazing meadows, that a community used for subsistence, but no one specifically owned. More
recently the idea of the com- mons has included common pool resources. Theorists describe
common pool resources as having two main attributes. First, they are subtractable, meaning one
person’s use of the resource subtracts from another’s use of the resource. Second, they are
nonexcludable, because the resource is so vast it is difficult if not impossible to prevent people
from using it. Similarly, all users of a common pool resource benefit from maintenance of that
resource, and it is impossible to exclude people from the improvements made by such
maintenance regardless of their contribution to that maintenance (Ostrom 1990).
While urban trees are not subtractable in the same sense as common pool resources such
as fish or timber, the decision to place a tree in one location over another has the same effect of
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limiting its use. Similarly, urban forests are a large enough resource that it is difficult to prevent
people from using them in some capacity, and their effects, known as ecosystem services, extend
beyond the boundaries laid out by those who planted them with intent to provide those services.
For example, all community members benefit from a tree’s ability to slow storm water runoff
and sequester carbon (Dwyer and others 1992). Similarly, maintaining the urban forest benefits
all community members as it will continue to provide those ecosystem services regardless of
property owners planting and/or maintaining their own trees on their own land.
The problem with urban forests as a common pool resource is that they are not fully
managed as such. While city officials manage trees on publicly owned land, those trees are
immediately adjacent to those on private property which are not subject to the same maintenance
protocols. Managers are often limited to enacting management policies on public lands due to
private property rights, despite most researchers defining the urban forest as all trees within a
city, regardless of ownership (Sanders 1984; Power 2009). Urban forests can thus be considered
a partially bound common pool resource, because only certain parts of it are actually held and
managed in common. Because of this, urban elms and the disease that destroyed them are an
example of the difficulty of managing a common pool resource that interacts with its adjacent,
privately owned counterpart.
Additionally, the beetles that carry Dutch elm disease move from tree to tree regardless
of who owns or manages those trees and are therefore part of the ecological commons. As
described by Mark Fiege, an environmental historian, ecological commons are mobile natures
that do not adhere to human cre- ated boundaries (Fiege 2005). As Fiege states, the idea of the
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ecological commons is a “stretching” of the theory of the commons because instead of an inert
location requiring management, the ecological commons are mobile natures that can intrude on
the production or maintenance of other resources. Rather than an area or resource that needs to
be managed to ensure continued use, Dutch elm disease is a pest that must be managed in order
to secure the continuation of another resource, the urban elm population. While most theorizing
of the ecological commons has been done in rural areas in the Western United States, cities
present an important addition to the literature given the complexity of urban property ownership
and the mobile natures that reside within them (Fiege 2005; Haggerty and Travis 2006).
The failure to stop Dutch elm disease in Syracuse shows how viewing urban elms as a
common pool resource, and the fungus and its vectors as an ecological common, explains the
spread of the disease in this city more thoroughly than biogeography alone. That is, many argue
that the ubiquity of elms enabled the epidemic and population density alone determined the
downfall of the elms. If the number of elms had been lower, or if they had not been planted so
close to one another, the beetle vector would not have flourished and thus the fungus would not
have spread as easily. However, despite a large population of elms, Syracuse was able to
suppress the spread of the disease when management protocols could account for the elms’
nature as a common resource. Because of this, without the framework of the commons
undergirding the story of Dutch elm disease in Syracuse, it is difficult to fully explain the pattern
of elm loss over time that occurred within the city.
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Dutch elm disease in the United States
By the time Dutch elm disease arrived in the United States, scientists well understood the
disease’s origin and reproductive cycle. While evidence suggests the fungus had been present in
the country as early as 1928, the first confirmed cases by the federal government were in 1930
(Worthley 1934). Two species of bark beetle, one native and one European, are the primary
vectors that carry the fungus. The beetles breed in diseased and dying trees but prefer to feed in
healthy trees. Thus, when new generations emerge from the dying elms, they can carry the
fungus from one tree to another (Buisman 1922). The primary methods of management, called
sanitation, are thus preventing the accumulation of diseased and dying elms in a process of
scouting and removal. Scouts search the field for elms showing disease symptoms, as well as for
those that are otherwise sickly, dying, or potential beetle breeding material. Any diseased or
devitalized tree is then removed before beetles can emerge. This prevents both the presence of
fungus in dying trees and reduces beetle populations by reducing breeding material (Tattar
1978).
Between 1930, when the fungus was first identified in the United States, and 1951, when
the federal program to eradicate it was defunded, the federal government used sanitation
techniques to remove nearly six million trees primarily located in New York, New Jersey,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania (Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine
1944). It is important to note that because the federal government sponsored this elimination-viasanitation strategy, the managers enacting the program could enforce this strategy everywhere,
regardless of property ownership. If a property owner was unwilling to allow managers onto
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their land to remove a diseased or dying elm, the man- agers could do so anyway without
negative legal ramifications (Worthley 1935).
Although the federal government experimentally used a variety of management
techniques to eradicate Dutch elm disease throughout the course of the elimination program,
sanitation was the considered best practice for stopping the disease’s spread. Officials did not
recommend common pesticides of the era, such as DDT, due to the lack of experimental
effectiveness and due to the quantity of the pesticide required (Bureau of Entomology and Plant
Quarantine 1947). However, once the federal government defunded the elimination pro- gram,
best practices were determined on a city-by-city basis not only by local recommendations but by
budgetary constraints. Regardless of their choice, however, cities did not have the power to enter
private property and enforce whichever strategy they chose. Management could only be done on
public property or lands with compliant property owners unless special regulatory legislation
passed allowing managers to enter private lands.
Dutch elm disease in Syracuse, New York
1951–1957: initial exposure, minimal management, and minimal elm loss
Dutch elm disease reached Syracuse in 1951, the same year all federal programs and
funding for control and eradication had ceased. The first confirmed case was found on the corner
of South Crouse Avenue and East Fayette Street, just east of the downtown business district, and
just north of Syracuse University (Carroll 1956b). Like many of the communities and cities in
central New York, Syracuse’s reputation for being a “City of Trees” depended heavily on the
elm population (Syracuse Post-Standard 22 November 1954). A survey done in 1960 found that
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19,838 (or 42 percent) of the city’s 47,000 street trees, those that grow in the right of ways
between streets and private front lawns, were susceptible species of elm. Additionally, 3,569
publicly maintained elms grew in the city’s parks, and private property owners maintained
19,946 elms growing in yards or on other private land. Based on this inventory, an estimated
total of 53,618 elms grew in the city when the fungus arrived (Miller, Silverborg, and Campana
1969). With a city area of approximately 25 square miles, that amounts to nearly 2,145 elms per
square mile. Figure 4.1 shows elms lining a city street, demonstrating not only their ubiquity, but
the valued urban landscape they produced.
The importance of elms in
the city and the potential for a
dramatic epidemic sparked
community concern, with the most
vocal advocate for disease control
coming from the scientists at the
College of Forestry (now the State
University of New York –
Environmental Science and Forestry,
or SUNY-ESF). Dr. Howard Miller,
a prominent entomologist and tree
expert, stressed the importance of
sanitation as the primary method of

Figure 4.1 Elms lining Plum Street near downtown
Syracuse, as shown in the Syracuse Post- Standard, 1956.
The image highlights how ubiquitous the American elm
was in the city prior to the arrival of Dutch elm disease.
Used with permission of the Onondaga Historical
Association.
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disease control, echoing the suggestions of the defunded federal management program (Syracuse
Post-Standard 24 October 1951). Despite pressure from Miller and other community members,
management by the city was reactive and focused mainly on the removal of visibly infected and
dying trees from publicly owned property (Syracuse Post-Standard 11 May 1954). Some citizens
were pleased with this, noting the many problems that elm trees presented, such as disrupting
electrical wires, splitting sidewalks and ruining sewers, with no acknowledgment of the problems
that would come with the loss of so many trees. In fact, they discouraged action against the
fungus, so the elms would have to be replaced (Syracuse Post-Standard 6 January 1957). Those
advocating on behalf of the elms had to point out that the “majority of houses and other buildings
in [the] area are not pleasing to the eye architecturally,” thus if the trees fell they would see
nothing but the “harsh, ugly lines” of the city’s homes (Carroll 1956a).
Although saving the elms did not have unanimous support, those in favor of preventing
their loss tended to be more vocal. Elm-loving citizens expressed their frustration at the lack of a
municipal response in letters to the local news- papers. Their arguments took two main
approaches: save the trees because they are an asset to the city and save the trees because not
doing so will be more expensive in the long run. Those calling for the city to consider the budget
highlighted the fact that one way or another, diseased elms would need to be removed. Doing so
in a way that prevented a total loss of the elm population would be less expensive, because not
every elm would require removal (Carroll 1956a). One such author warned that “penny pinching
now would lead to expenses one hundred times greater in the future,” (Syracuse Post-Standard 9
October 1957) and another argued that, “the campaign to save Syracuse elms will cost money,
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but it will be money well spent. Its elms are among the city’s greatest assets,” highlighting the
importance of elms to the city’s forested reputation (Syracuse Post-Standard 16 December 1956).
Some opted for a doomsday approach, claiming to write an emotional “obituary for the elms,” or
dramatized the need for a “war” against the fungus to save the trees (Carroll 1956b; Syracuse
Post-Standard 4 August 1956).
While city officials procrastinated on official Dutch elm disease management policy,
community members opted to organize themselves to help the elms. Groups such as the Syracuse
Kiwanis Club pressed officials for action, organized educational events for residents, and
encouraged their neighbors to act (Syracuse Post-Standard 31 October 1954). Though nearby
communities had seen some success with DDT, Miller argued that the large cost associated with
purchasing the chemicals every year, in addition to equipment and personnel required to
distribute it, made such a project infeasible for the city to accomplish. This fact, in light of the
mixed results of such pesticides, led the citizens, and eventually city officials to follow his
advice and focus on a rigorous sanitation and maintenance program (Miller, Silverborg, and
Campana 1969). Most garden-advice columnists supported Miller’s perspective, remaining
staunch advocates of sanitation and suggesting homeowners keep elm wood several hundred feet
from healthy trees to prevent spread of the fungus, though they might be willing to suggest DDT
for other purposes such as leaf beetles (Syracuse Post-Standard 4 May 1952). Therefore, private
use of the chemical was likely not a major component of Dutch elm disease control, and it is
estimated that less than one percent of the elms in the city were regularly sprayed with pesticides
(Miller, Silverborg, and Campana 1969).
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This initial introductory period was characterized by a lack of active management from
city officials and no guaranteed response from homeowners, but as shown in Figure 4.2 there
was little elm loss in the immediate years following the first confirmed infection. The elms likely
benefitted from a small population of beetles, as the primary vector had only recently been
introduced into the city (Miller, Silverborg, and Campana 1969). Similarly, the lag between
initial infection, symptoms, and tree loss likely caused the small number of elms lost during this
timeframe. As the community debated best practices, the fungus continued to spread throughout
the city, and the number of infections rose each year, eventually leading city officials to act.
1958-1965: maximum management, minimal elm loss
The ever-increasing number of elms lost to Dutch elm disease, in addition to the urging
from the community, finally led the city to develop a comprehensive management strategy to
combat Dutch elm disease in 1957 (Syracuse Post-Standard 13 May 1957; 13 June 1957; 19
October 1957). As advocated by the community, the primary technique was sanitation. Two
ordinances enabled the city to thoroughly enact this policy. First, an ordinance preventing the
storage of elm wood became a key factor in ensuring homeowners did not store beetle and
disease-harboring logs on their property (Syracuse Post-Standard 30 July 1965). Second, an
ordinance allowing city officials to enter private property and remove diseased elm trees ensured
management could be enforced on all elm trees within the city limits (Syracuse Post-Standard 26
April 1959). These, and other key events, are highlighted in the timeline in Figure 4.3. Loss of
standing elms to the fungus went from 2.07 percent in 1957 to 0.85 percent in 1958 (Figure 4.2).
The success encouraged the city to continue the sanitation program, and editorials shifted from

109

doomsday predictions toward optimistic sentiments, suggesting the city would be free of the
fungus within “two or three years” if the program continued (Syracuse Post-Standard 14;
Syracuse Herald-American 4 January 1960). From 1958–1964, officials successfully maintained
the program, and never lost more than 2 percent of the elm population in any given year. That 2
percent loss was attributed to other factors, such as storm damage and age that exacerbated
disease symptoms, was expected and not outside normal loss predictions (Miller, Silverborg, and
Campana 1969).

Figure 4.2 Percent of remaining elm population lost each year to Dutch elm disease in Syracuse,
NY. The disease arrived in 1951 but was not actively managed until 1957. A drought from 19611965 led to increased losses that functionally ended the city-wide program in 1965, leading to
exponential elm loss. Recreated from data compiled by Miller, Silverborg, and Campana 1969.
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Figure 4.3 A timeline notes the important events in the history and management of
Dutch elm disease in Syracuse. Management periods and their effect on percentage
of elm trees lost to the disease are based on archival evidence and the graph
recreated in Figure 4.2. Image created by author.
Despite the “dismal” outlook nationwide, it appeared Syracuse would be one of the lucky
cities able to save their elms (Delvin 1963). Editorials cele- brated the city’s successful and
prompt removal of infected elms (Ganley 1962; Syracuse Post-Standard 4 May 1961). Miller
shifted his focus from managing the fungus to replacing the trees that were dying, to ensure
continued vigor of the urban forest (Syracuse Post-Standard 5 January 1960). The city continued
elm removal, even when they lost the ability to burn the wood in the nearby county dump.
Concerns over air quality meant statewide legislation against burning near residential areas
(Syracuse Herald-American 21 November 1963). The inability to dispose of infected wood had
the potential to ruin the sanitation program, because felled trees would remain in the area
allowing beetles to emerge and spread the fungus. However, the city simply shifted from burning
to burying the wood, an equally successful way to prevent the beetles from emerging from the
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downed trees (Syracuse Herald-American 2). The city of Syracuse became an exemplar of
successful management, and even began an experimental plot in a local park to prove the success
of pesticide free management (Syracuse Herald-American 14 April 1961). The pesticide-free
management eventually caught the attention of environmentalists. Most notably Rachel Car- son
used Syracuse as an “especially impressive” example of managing Dutch elm disease without
using DDT. She noted that the city went from no management program leading to the loss of
“nearly 3,000 elms” to an “intensive drive” for sanitation that decreased losses to less than 1
percent of the elm population per year (Carson 1962, 116–117). While she was correct that once
the city began more actively managing the fungus they were able to temporarily stop the loss of
elms, their eventual loss shows that perhaps she spoke too soon.
Managing Dutch elm disease became more complicated when an intermittent drought hit
the Syracuse area in 1961. Though much of New York State had been experiencing a range of
drought conditions, with severity varying by location in a patchwork of moderate to severe dry
and warmer than average conditions throughout the state as early as 1959, it was not until 1961
that the city itself began seeing near-drought conditions resulting from elevated temperatures and
low precipitation within its limits (Graham 1961). Coverage of the drought focused on the effects
in Syracuse’s surrounding suburbs and agricultural communities, however the dry conditions
also impacted the urban forest. As shown in Figure 2, the city began losing higher percentages of
their standing elms starting in 1963. As healthy trees became weakened due to the dry
conditions, they became more attractive to bark beetles, thus making them more likely to become
infected. Though they may have been able to withstand the drought itself, the stress of the
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drought and beetle attack made them more likely to be
exposed and succumb to Dutch elm disease (Syracuse
Post-Standard 20 March 1966).
1965 onward: minimal management, exponential elm loss
Intermittent drought continued in the Syracuse
area for many years, though by 1966 reports were no
longer including Syracuse in the drought affected zone on
their maps (Syracuse Post-Standard 7 August 1964;
Coyne 1966). Despite the drought ending, the damage had
already been done to the city’s ability to manage Dutch
elm disease. As the elms deteriorated during the drought,
the city struggled to keep up with the necessary removals.
Scouts condemned trees but did not remove them
immediately (Peters 1966; Lamar 1966). Figure 4.4 shows
the creative ways residents attempted to call attention to
the issue. Combined with a decrease in enforcement of the
elm wood storage ordinance, the drought led to increased
fungus and beetle populations in the stressed and
devitalized trees that were not promptly removed, and the
percent of standing elms lost each year continued to rise
(Syracuse Post-Standard 17).

Figure 4.4 As the city became
overwhelmed with the number of
elms becoming infected, residents
found ways to draw attention to
those in obvious need of removal.
Shown here, a resident on the
northern edge of the city
vandalized two dead elms to show
their displeasure that the trees
were becoming a safety hazard to
pedestrians. Photograph originally
appeared in the Syracuse PostStandard, 1970. Used with
permission of the Onondaga
Historical Association.
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Additionally, as larger trees, and/or trees in areas requiring more careful removal became
infected, tree removal costs began to skyrocket (Syracuse Post- Standard 30 July 1965). In 1951,
when the fungus first arrived in the city, removing a diseased tree cost as little as $100. In the
mid-1960s, costs had jumped to at least $500 per tree (Russo 1968). The city’s sanitation
program not only lacked the manpower to remove so many trees but could no longer afford
removal (Syracuse Herald-American 22 December 1966). In 1968, the city officially stopped
subsidizing private tree removal to cut costs, though the program had ended in practice in 1965.
Once again, only trees on publicly owned and man- aged lands were subject to the extensive
scouting and sanitation program (Syracuse Herald-American 12 February 1968). Unlike the
initial infection period, however, there was now a large population of beetles, fungus, and
susceptible elms. Although their ability to remove trees had been hampered by the number of
trees needing removal, dead and dying elms were still be removed eventually. But being unable
to pay for private tree removal meant the city could no longer guarantee every diseased elm
would be removed. Delayed removal was better than no removal, however they could no longer
enforce this policy. Officials were reliant on private property owners to take the initiative to not
only request elm trees be surveyed and identified as infected, but the property owner also had to
bear the burden of the cost of removal. For some property owners, this meant they must cover
the cost for as many as eight tree removals. That cost burden made it unlikely that every diseased
tree was removed, thus allowing the fungus and beetle material to continue to build up on private
property as the city adjusted its management strategy and continued sanitation solely on the
publicly maintained elms (Syracuse Herald-American 5). Even if the city had been able to
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perfectly enact sanitation on public lands, private trees would act as a constant source of beetles
and fungus to infect the public trees.
As the percent of trees lost to the fungus continued to rise, the city-funded management
plan shifted from a policy of saving the elms to harm and liability prevention. As residents began
threatening to sue over safety concerns, removal focused on street trees, with particular emphasis
given to those that were brittle enough or located in such places that not tending to them would
be potentially harmful to pedestrians (Syracuse Herald-American 5 September 1968; Syracuse
Herald-American 17 September 1968). The return to reactionary management and a focus only
on already diseased and dying elms within the public domain, as opposed to proactive prevention
of disease spread throughout the entire elm population regardless of ownership, and an inability
to access private property to enforce removals, led to an exponential increase in infections and
tree loss after 1965 (Figure 2).
As the elms continued to die, the conversation turned political. One mayoral candidate
suggested the program had failed and derided his predecessor for claiming the program had been
successful while wasting money that could have been spent on the city’s deteriorating schools
(Syracuse Herald-American 24 September 1969). The loss was compounded by an additional
disease, elm phloem necrosis, found in the city in 1971 (Syracuse Herald-American 15
September 1971). Elm phloem necrosis, a viral disease spread by insects, is fatal to elms, though
it never reached the epidemic proportions of Dutch elm dis- ease (Lanier, Schubert, and Manion
1988). Faced with an overwhelming burden of diseased trees and a political climate shifting
away from an interest in city beautification, all preventative sanitation measures were halted in
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1972 (Syracuse Post-Standard 11 February 1972). As predicted by the city’s activists when the
fungus first arrived in Syracuse, the city was now burdened with the removal of thousands of
already dead elms (Carroll 1956b).
Today, the only elms that exist in Syracuse are Dutch elm disease resistant cultivars
planted within the past decade. Research on resistant elm cultivars in the 1970’s, done in an
attempt to reinstate the elm as America’s most popular shade tree, found that only nine of
100,000 cultivars studied had resistance to Dutch elm disease (Pinchot and others 2017).
Although they are resistant to this particular fungus, other species have become popular in their
absence, and the elms are no longer common in the city. Given this fact, in addition to the trend
toward diversifying the urban forest, means that elms are unlikely to return to their former
popularity and ubiquity.
Discussion: urban forests through the lens of the commons
When considering the loss of elms in Syracuse, it is easy to focus on the natural disasters
that occurred toward the end of the Dutch elm disease epidemic. However, it is important to note
that although elm phloem necrosis and the drought of the mid-to-late sixties did not help the
elms, they would likely not have nearly as negative of an effect on their own. For example, in a
study just outside of Syracuse, elm phloem necrosis, eventually renamed elm yellows, did not
begin having a widespread effect on elm populations until 1981. Although it did eventually have
a devastating effect on the studied population, for half of the study timeframe Dutch elm disease
was a more significant factor in elm death (Lanier, Schubert, and Manion 1988). Similarly,
although extreme drought can cause tree dieback in urban areas, it can vary widely based on land
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use (Fahey, Bialecki, and Carter 2013; Bialecki, Fahey, and Scharenbroch 2018). More
important than drought induced dieback on its own, there is evidence that drought conditions
make trees more susceptible to pests (Cregg and Dix 2001). Therefore, the drought from 1961
through 1966 was likely a factor in increasing the elm bark beetle population and exacerbating
the epidemic of Dutch elm disease rather than being a significant cause of dieback on its own.
This exacerbation led to faltering of the management plan as increasing cost and number of
removals overwhelmed the city’s resources. This required the city to stop tree removals on
private property, which in turn led to the widespread epidemic and loss of all elm trees in
Syracuse.
The problem of Dutch elm disease in Syracuse, then, was a conflict of how the trees and
their pests were managed and how they were viewed. While elms were considered a common
pool resource, they were managed as a partially bounded common. No matter how well the city
managed their elm trees, the disease could constantly be reintroduced from adjacent private
property. As described above, management of Dutch elm disease was most successful when the
borders between privately and publicly managed land were irrelevant to implementing the
strategy of sanitation. When the city lost the ability to man- age elms on private lands due to an
overwhelming number of infections and cost of tree removal, the entire common pool resource
was lost. This was in large part because the elms that remained on private property could act as a
constant source of the fungus and its vectors.
This conflict between how trees are viewed as commons but managed based on land
ownership appears frequently in management protocols and in research on urban forests. For
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example, the management plan for Onondaga County (in which Syracuse is located) for Emerald
Ash Borer, a contemporary pest that affects the ash species that replaced elm, does not address
the fact that this beetle can fly from county land that they have an extensive strategy for, onto
private or otherwise noncounty land (Onondaga County Office for the Environment 2014). The
same problem that occurred with Dutch elm disease seems inevitable for the ash: no matter how
well the county implements its strategy to control Emerald Ash Borer, adjacent land not subject
to county management can and will act as a source of the beetle and potentially harm the countyowned trees if those lands do not have a similarly extensive program.
While urban forest research has not explicitly addressed the issue of the commons in
management, there is an understanding that private property owners have significant impact on
the urban forest. This research has previously been framed as addressing the importance of
private trees due to their abundance and importance of such trees in the city’s ecosystem
(Nassauer, Wang, and Dayrell 2009; Conway 2016; Nguyen and others 2017). In some cases, the
majority of urban trees exist and are managed privately. However, the commons framework
helps to explain the disparity between how urban trees are viewed as an ecological system but
are managed within a framework of private and public property that makes such research on
homeowner opinion and management activities even more relevant.
Just as research on private property owners’ opinions and management of their trees is
aided by a commons framework, such research helps explain the details of what happened in
Syracuse regarding Dutch elm disease. By under- standing how homeowners view and manage
their trees, researchers can help managers address the fact that they may not always have access
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to private property, a previously overlooked component of urban forest management. For
example, Conway investigated motivations for tree maintenance and removal on private property
in Mississauga, Ontario, Canada (Conway 2016). Most notably, she found that homeowners are
willing to leave unwanted trees standing if removal is “too much effort/money,” which surely
played a role in dis- eased elms left on private property in Syracuse. Similarly, Nassauer and her
co-authors highlighted the importance of neighborhood scale cultural norms in residents’
opinions of ecological or conventional yard design (Nassauer, Wang, and Dayrell 2009). Dutch
elm disease in Syracuse highlights similar norms playing out in residents’ willingness to
participate in management. The number of letters to the editor and frequent inclusion of Dutch
elm disease management in the newspaper archives demonstrates an attempt by city residents to
encourage their neighbors to participate and help the city stop the disease.
Data limitations in urban forest research also tends to reinforce this contra- diction of
how trees are understood versus how they are managed. For example, urban foresters often
suggest diversification as an attempt to prevent another epidemic such as Dutch elm disease. The
policy suggestion is to ensure that the urban forest is made up of no more than 10 percent of a
single species, 20 percent of a single genus, and 30 percent of a single family (Santamour 1990).
Although the feasibility of enacting such a plan has been called into question, researchers and
managers believe that such a population structure could prevent catastrophic tree loss in the
event of a new introduced pest or pathogen (Roman and others 2018). However, in studies
looking specifically at diversification of urban forests after Dutch elm disease, researchers have
focused on either street trees or privately owned trees (Raupp, Cumming, and Raupp 2006;
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Berland and Elliott 2014). Despite having only captured a limited picture of the urban forest by
limiting their data to either public or private trees, such studies frequently make broad claims
about the structure, health, and vulnerability of urban forests. Similarly, calls for diversification
do little to aid in managing pests of trees that have already been established in the city. That is,
calls for diversification can only be acted upon once a pest such as Dutch elm disease has
enabled managers to overhaul the species structure of their forests.
In addition to seeing elms as a common pool resource, the Dutch elm disease fungus and
the beetles that carry it can be viewed as part of the ecological common. They are natural
phenomena that can cross manmade boundaries and must be managed as such. Other examples
of the ecological commons, such as weeds or elk in the Western United States, highlight the need
for cooperation among stakeholders in order to prevent ecological harm on private property
(Fiege 2005; Haggerty and Travis 2006). In these examples, the stake- holders were able to come
together to adequately manage their ecological com- mon problem. But in the case of Dutch elm
disease in Syracuse, the public was at least somewhat divided on how to best manage Dutch elm
disease. Even for those who did want to save the elms, they may not have been able to do so
because of the cost. Not only was the actual cost of tree removal potentially overwhelming,
homeowners may have been hesitant to remove trees if they could not bear the burden of losing
such a culturally and likely personally important tree from their land, especially if the trees were
not in bad health from a layman’s perspective. Allowing trees to stand while homeowners waited
until the elms were visibly dying or until they could save for the cost of removal allowed more
time for the beetles and fungus to spread from private property. In this way, not only is Dutch
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elm disease an example of an ecological common, it is an example of the tragedy of the
ecological common. By not being able to cooperate and maintain the management plan, all
stakeholders in Syracuse suffered the loss of the elms.
Conclusion: recommendations for urban forest policy and research
Forest pests and pathogens like Dutch elm disease are becoming increasingly common in
a globalizing world. The most frequent cited lesson from Dutch elm disease has been a call for
diversification of the urban forest. However, diversification alone cannot solve the problem of
geographic disparities in the ability to manage such pests. Viewing Dutch elm disease and urban
trees as an ecological problem alone, past research has ignored the contributions of management,
or lack thereof, on the spread of the fungus. Because these trees and their pests are intimately
related to the decisions of human managers, it is crucial we understand how those managers
think about the urban forest. By creating a clearer interpretation of how we view the urban
forests and its pests as common pool resource and ecological common problem, urban forest
man- agers are better informed as to where resources for pest management must be allocated.
When a manager has no access to private property, for example, it would be wise to include
strategies regarding education about urban forest pests and diversification in addition to
managing public trees themselves, in order to ensure community commitment to tree and pest
management. By educating residents on not only the importance of trees and their ecosystem
services, but highlighting the residents’ own role in maintaining the forest, epidemics like Dutch
elm disease might be better avoided in the future.

121

References
Berland, A., and G. P. Elliott. 2014. Unexpected Connections between Residential Urban Forest
Diversity and Vulnerability to Two Invasive Beetles. Landscape Ecology 29 (1): 141–52.
Bialecki, M. B., R. T. Fahey, and B. Scharenbroch. 2018. Variation in Urban Forest
Productivity and Response to Extreme Drought across a Large Metropolitan Region. Urban
Ecosystems 21 (1): 157–69.
Buisman, C. J. 1922. “Ceratostomella Ulmi. The Sexual Form of Graphium Ulmi.” In Dutch
Elm Disease–The Early Papers: Selected Works of Seven Dutch Women
Phytopathologists, 49–49. Translated by F.W. Holmes and H. M. Heybroek. St Paul,
Minn.: American Phytopatholigical Society Press.
Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine. 1944. “Report for Week Ending December 2,
1944.” United States Department of Agriculture. Dutch elm disease Weekly Reports and
Correspondence. Record Group 007. National Archives and Records Administration—
Kansas City, Mo.
. 1947. “What to Do about the Dutch Elm Disease.” United States Department of
Agriculture. Central Correspondence, Subject Correspondence Dis-Fru. Record Group 007.
National Archives and Records Administration—Kansas City, Mo.
Campanella, T. 2007. Republic of Shade: New England and the American Elm. New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press.
Carroll, W. 1956a. Cheaper to Save Trees—Kiwanis to Fight Dutch Elm Disease. Syracuse
Post- Standard, 28 March.
. 1956b. The Dutch Elm Disease. Syracuse Post-Standard, 7 October.
Carson, R. 1962. “And No Birds Sing.” In Silent Spring. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Conway, T. M. 2016. Tending Their Urban Forest: Residents’ Motivations for Tree Planting
and Removal. Urban Forestry and Urban Greening 17: 23–32.
Coyne, J. R. 1966. Dry Northeast: We Need Months of Rainfall. Syracuse Herald-American, 16
April.
Cregg, B. M., and M. E. Dix. 2001. Tree Moisture Stress and Insect Damage in Urban Areas in
Relation to Heat Island Effects. Journal of Arboriculture 27 (1): 8–17.
Delvin, J. C. 1963. Expert Predicts Doom of U.S. Elm. New York Times, 1 December.
Dwyer, J. F., G. McPherson, H. W. Schroeder, and R. A. Rowntree. 1992. Assessing the
Benefits and Costs of the Urban Forest. Journal of Arboriculture 18 (5): 227–227.
Fahey, R. T., M. B. Bialecki, and D. R. Carter. 2013. Tree Growth and Resilience to Extreme
Drought across an Urban Land-Use Gradient. Arboriculture and Urban Forestry 39 (6):
279–85.
Fiege, M. 2005. The Weedy West: Mobile Nature, Boundaries, and Common Space in the
Montana Landscape. Western Historical Quarterly 36 (1): 22–47.
Ganley, J. V. 1962. City Gaining Ground in War on Dutch Elm Tree Disease. Syracuse HeraldAmerican, 11 March.
Graham, R. 1961. Heat, Lack of Good Rain Bringing Near Drought. Syracuse Post-Standard, 15
September.

122

Haggerty, J. H., and W. R. Travis. 2006. Out of Administrative Control: Absentee Owners,
Resident Elk and the Shifting Nature of Wildlife Management in Southwestern Montana.
Geoforum 37 (5): 816–30.
Herms, D. A., and D. G. McCullough. 2014. Emerald Ash Borer Invasion of North America:
History, Biology, Ecology, Impacts, and Management. Annual Review of Entomology 59
(1): 13–30.
Hoyt, A. S. 1951. “Letter J. A. Beal, In Charge, Forest Insect Investigations.” DED-Maryland,
Dutch Elm Disease Project File- Del. to Wisonsin, Records of the Bureau of Entomology
and Plant Quarantine, 1863–1956, Record Group 007. National Archives and Records
Administration— Kansas City, Mo.
Kondo, E. S., Y. Hiratsuka, and W. B. G. Denyer. 1981. Proceedings of the Dutch Elm Disease
Symposium and Workshop. Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada: Manitoba Deptartment of
Natural Resources.
Lamar, C. 1966. Remove Dead Elms. Syracuse Post-Standard, 30 August.
Lanier, G. N., D. C. Schubert, and P. D. Manion. 1988. Dutch Elm Disease and Elm Yellows in
Central New York: Out of the Frying Pan into the Fire. Plant Disease Reporter 72 (3): 189–
94. Miller, H. C., S. B. Silverborg, and R. J. Campana. 1969. Dutch Elm Disease: Relation
of Spread and Intensification to Control by Sanitation in Syracuse. New York. Plant
Disease Reporter 53
(7): 551–55.
Nassauer, J. I., Z. Wang, and E. Dayrell. 2009. What Will the Neighbors Think? Cultural Norms
and Ecological Design. Landscape and Urban Planning 92 (3–4): 282–92.
Nguyen, V. D., L. A. Roman, D. H. Locke, S. K. Mincey, J. R. Sanders, F. Smith, M. DuranMitchell, and S. L. Tobing. 2017. Branching Out to Residential Lands: Missions and
Strategies of Five Tree Distribution Programs in the U.S. Urban Forestry and Urban
Greening 22: 24–35.
Onondaga County Office for the Environment. 2014. “Onondaga County Ash Tree
Management Strategy.” http://ongov.net/environment/emeraldashborer.html.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University
Press.
Peters, K. 1966. Falling Branches Create a Menace. Syracuse Herald-American, 16 November.
Pinchot, C. C., C. E. Flower, K. S. Knight, C. Marks, R. Minocha, D. Lesser, and P. G.
Schaberg,
and others 2017. “Development of New Dutch Elm Disease-Tolerant Selections for Restoration
of the American Elm in Urban and Forested Landscapes.” Banking on the Future, 11.
Power, G. 2009. Regulatory Takings: A Chronicle of the Construction of a Constitutional
Concept. BYU Journal of Public Law, 1–23.
Raupp, M. J., A. B. Cumming, and E. C. Raupp. 2006. Street Tree Diversity in Eastern North
America and Its Potential for Tree Loss to Exotic Borers. Arboriculture and Urban Forestry
32 (6): 297–304.

123

Roman, L. A., H. Pearsall, T. S. Eisenman, T. M. Conway, R. T. Fahey, S. Landry, J. Vogt, et
al. 2018. Human and Biophysical Legacies Shape Contemporary Urban Forests: A
Literature Synthesis. Urban Forestry & Urban Greening 31 (April): 157–68.
Russo, C. T. 1968. Fight to Save Elms. Syracuse Herald-American, 7 January.
Sanders, R. A. 1984. Some Determinants of Urban Forest Structure. Urban Ecology 8 (1–2):
13–27. Santamour, F. S. 1990. “Trees for Urban Planting: Diversity, Uniformity and
Common Sense.” In
Proceedings of the Seventh Conference of the Metropolitan Tree Improvement Alliance, 57–66.
Morton Arboretum.
Sinclair, W. A., and R. J. Campana. 1978. Dutch Elm Disease: Perspectives after 60 Years.
Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, New York State College of
Agriculture and Life Sciences.
Syracuse Herald-American. 1960. “Dutch Elm Disease- City’s Program Working,” 4 January, 1.
. 1961. “Plan Dutch Elm Disease Experiment,” 14 April, 3.
. 1963. “End of Tree Burning? New State Law Prohibits Dump Fires,” 21 November, 2.
. 1966. “$665,000 for Tree Campaign- 4200 Elms to Be Removed,” 22 December, 4.
. 1968. “A Switch on Tree Removal,” 12 February, 5.
. 1968. “Threaten Injury Suits over Tree Trimming,” 17 September, 6.
. 1969. “Elm Disease Control among the Best -Walsh,” 24 September, 7.
. 1971. “Deadly as Dutch: New Elm Blight Appears,” 15 September, 8.
Syracuse Post-Standard. 1951. “Syracusans to See Method of Fighting Dutch Elm Disease,” 24
October, 2.
. 1952. “Spring Care Hits Dutch Elm Disease,” 4 May, 9.
. 1954. “Diseased Elms to Be Destroyed,” 11 May, 3.
. 1954. “Group to Launch Campaign Aimed at Controlling Spread of Dutch Elm
Disease
in Area,” 31 October, 8.
. 1954. “Fast Action Is Required to Keep ‘City of Trees,’” 22 November, 1.
. 1956. “War on Dutch Elm Disease Necessary to Save Trees,” 4 August, 7.
. 1956. “Our Elms Menaced,” 16 December, 6.
. 1957. “Oak Proposed as Elm Substitute,” 6 January, 4.
. 1957. “Dutch Elm War Fought on Two Fronts,” 13 May, 10.
. 1957. “Local Control of Dutch Elm Disease Urged,” 13 June, 11.
. 1957. “Experts Will Launch War on Dutch Elm Disease,” 9 October, 5.
. 1957. “City Called ‘Unprogressive’ - Coolness to Elm Disease Irks Expert,” 19 October,
12.
. 1959. “City Granted Power to Axe Sick Trees,” 26 April, 14.
. 1960. “Dutch Elm Disease Hits 732 Trees,” 5 January, 16.
. 1961. “600 Diseased Elms Felled in 4 Months,” 4 May, 15.
. 1964. “Third Year in a Row: Survey Reveals CNY Area Severely Hit by
Drought,” 7 August, 18.
. 1965a. “Dutch Elm Disease Spreading in City,” 30 July, 19.
. 1965. “Lack of Understanding Cited-700 City Elms Said Infected by Disease,” 30 July, 13.

124

. 1966. “Burn, Do Not Store, Diseased Elm,” 20 March, 17.
. 1972. “Tree Removal to End,” 11 February, 20.
Tattar, T. A. 1978. “Wilt Diseases of Trees: Dutch Elm Disease.” In Disease of Shade Trees.
New York: Academic Press, Inc.
U.S. Census Bureau. 2012. “Metropolitan and Micropolitan Population Change: 2000 to 2010.”
2012. https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2012/dec/c2010sr-01.html.
Worthley, L. H. 1934. “Memo to Avery S. Hoyt.” United States Department of Agriculture,
Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine. Dutch elm disease Control Correspondence,
Record Group 007. National Archives and Records Administration—Kansas City, Mo.
. 1935. “Outline of Dutch Elm Disease Eradication Program.” United States
Department
of Agriculture, Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine. Dutch elm
disease Control Correspondence, Record Group 007. National Archives and Records
Administration—Kansas City, Mo.

125

Chapter 5: Conclusion
On April 10, 1931, the Syracuse Colony
of the National Society of New England
Women planted an elm tree in Thornden
Park to honor the 200th anniversary of the
birth of George Washington. Not to be
outdone, the Syracuse Chapter of the Sons
of the American Revolution similarly
honored Washington by planting another
elm nearby just over a year later, on May
3, 1932. Over eighty years after that, as a
student at Syracuse University, I passed
the plaques regularly as I walked to
campus from my apartment in the
adjacent neighborhood. The plaques were
a daily reminder of the fundamental
question that drove my research: if people

Figure 5.1 Plaques in Thornden Park where elms were
planted commemorating George Washington, one in 1931 by
the Syracuse Colony National Society of New England
Women (top) and one in 1932 by the Syracuse Chapter of the
Sons of American Revolution (bottom).

across the country loved elms deeply, planted them widely, and strived to save them, why did
most elms perish? Why did they lose the battle against Dutch elm disease?
The problems with management of Dutch elm disease in the United States began before
the fungus even arrived here. Despite the urging of tree enthusiasts and professionals, the Bureau
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did not implement the quarantine to prevent the importation of the disease until it had already
been introduced. Even then, the quarantine to prevent further importation of the disease was
weak – rather than embargoing all elm products, regulators waffled on the type and severity of
restrictions put on elm imports. As described in Chapter 2, by allowing any elm products to be
imported, officials gave distributors the opportunity to bend the rules regarding the restrictions
on their products. Rather than simply being able to turn away elm shipments, quarantine officers
had to hold and inspect these products, ensuring that potentially infectious material not only
made it to the country but remained in ports for long periods of time. While these elm products
awaited inspection, the beetles emerging from them escaped and spread the disease. Similarly,
not all elms were imported as the primary product. While there might have only been a dozen
veneer factories importing elm burls, the presumed culprit for the fungus’ arrival, countless
unregulated shipments of other products were arriving in packing material made of elm. Seven
years after the embargo on elm material entering the United States was put into place, traders
were still using elm wood crates to move products. The packing material proved a minor threat,
since only a handful of examined cases carried the fungus. But the story of pests and diseases
spreading by packing material is now a common trope in invasive species literature. By allowing
elm material to be imported, so the story goes, decision-makers in the Bureau of Entomology and
Plant Quarantine allowed the ongoing reintroduction of the fungus and its vectors.
It is likely that even with an embargo the fungus would have eventually made it to the
United States, but the domestic quarantine put into place to control its spread was also
inadequate. Although elm products of any kind could not leave the infected zone, Bureau
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officials made every effort to limit what constituted that zone. Areas that had infections but were
not contiguous to the outbreak near New York City were not subjected to the quarantine
protocols. The area of the infected zone, though growing on a weekly basis, was only updated in
official quarantine notices that were released infrequently, often with years in between them.
Despite an active eradication protocol that sent scouts into a perimeter of the main disease zone
to identify and remove new infections, the quarantine area had no such protective boundary.
Additionally, only the fungus itself was being controlled through regulation of the materials that
might carry it. Although this was the primary mode of disease spread, none of the quarantine
documents had provision for preventing movement of the fungus’ vectors. The vectors’ presence
did not guarantee disease presence, but disease presence required the presence of a vector.
Identifying the vector did not require laboratory confirmation like the fungus did and would have
enabled inspection and identification of elm material in the field, providing both method and
rationale for quarantine inspectors to stop the movement of such material.
These were practical limitations to the effectiveness of the quarantines to control the
spread of Dutch elm disease. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, these missteps were not simply
uninformed oversights. In fact, the chief of the Bureau, Dr. Lee Strong, made the decision to
limit the quarantine measures despite objections by other Bureau scientists, due to what he felt
was the best theoretical work in plant pathology at the time. When it came to plant diseases, he
saw little value in quarantine as a method of control. Rather, Strong and some of his
contemporaries felt it was important to be selective in creation and enforcement of quarantines in
order to maintain high public opinion of such regulations. He saw the potential backlash to an
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embargo on elm trade that might have failed as worse than the actual spread of the disease under
a quarantine that was less severe. By crippling the ability of the quarantine to substantially limit
the movement of elm, in addition to ignoring the vector as a potential component of the
quarantine regulations, Strong successfully ensured that the public did not rail against strict
limitations on trade. However, he also ensured the quarantine was incapable of successfully
preventing the spread of the disease.
As the chief of the Bureau, Strong’s opinions had influence on all aspects of the Dutch
elm disease management program. Strong’s commitment to eradicating the fungus became key
in the decisions made to manage it. As described in Chapter 3, Strong remained committed to
eradication even after the discovery of latent infections, the term used to describe the fact that
elm trees can have the fungus without showing symptoms. To fully eradicate the disease crews
would need to test every living elm, rather than just those that were visibly ill – an impractical if
not impossible task. Because of this, the Bureau might have more effectively shifted priorities
from eradication toward control. Several scientists within the Bureau encouraged pruning as a
method of keeping elm trees healthy. This would make them less attractive to the fungus’ vectors
and thus less likely to get the disease. Additionally, if the trees did get the disease, well
maintained trees would be less likely to suffer the sort of damage that would expose the fungus
and allow it to spread. Strong was resistant to this plan, instead doubling down on eradication
and sanitation. He called for a plan that left only the most valuable urban elms standing, while
clearcutting all others in the main disease area. Unlike Strong’s stance on quarantines, it is less
clear from the archival record why he was so committed to eradication over control. Once Strong
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passed away and his successors were able to implement pruning as the program’s focus, it was
too late. Congress and the American people had lost faith in the program’s ability to succeed, and
the task of saving the elm was left to individual cities.
Cities like Syracuse, where Dutch elm disease arrived after the federal management
program ended, were left to their own devices when it came time to determine a plan to save the
elms. With little guidance from the defunct federal program, officials had to decide between the
status quo of sanitation and eradication or moving toward the use of chemical pesticides to save
the trees. Fortunately, Syracuse was home to a forestry school where scientists were able to
prevent the use of DDT – a costly treatment against Dutch elm disease’s vectors with disastrous
unintended consequences for other wildlife. Some citizens were committed to the cause, but
officials in Syracuse were unable to save their trees. Unlike the federal program, the city
government did not have access to all property where infected trees grew. As long as the city had
special legislation and funding to allow the removal of trees on private property, the incidence
and loss of elm to the disease was minimal. When they lost that ability, they could not force
homeowners to remove trees. Homeowners, especially those who were unaware of the disease,
its symptoms and its consequences, were unwilling to remove elms from their property. Why
bear the cost of tree removal, both financially and aesthetically, when it only appeared that one
or two branches had wilted? Thus, despite participating in active sanitation and eradication on
public property, there were always areas of the city in the form of private property that harbored
the fungus and its vectors on private property. Though the details of Syracuse’s epidemic are
likely unique, the case study presents an example of what cities across the country have had to

130

face in the nearly seventy years since the federal program ended, in terms of choosing a
management protocol and dealing with the consequences in terms of saving their trees.
Lessons from Dutch elm disease
In histories of the American elm, authors often argue that the program failed due to underfunding
and insufficient workers. According to these authors, there wasn’t enough money, and if funds
were available, they could not find enough employees to work the field crews. While these
difficulties existed, the decision-making processes enforced by Strong had a similarly negative
influence on the outcome of the program. Other explanations of the loss of elm by urban
foresters focus on the trees’ ubiquity – that the sheer quantity of elms ensured their downfall
because the disease could spread too easily among them.
My analysis of the details of the federal program to eradicate Dutch elm disease, coupled
with my case study of the effect of the disease in a city once that program ended, reveals a
number of administrative, procedural and theoretical issues that have been overlooked in earlier
accounts of the program’s outcome. First, from an administrative standpoint both the quarantine
and the eradication program overwhelmingly demonstrate the flaws in top-down decision
making. Although Sheals might not have shared Strong’s pedigree within the Bureau, his
experience in the field made the problems of the quarantine obvious to him. Second, several
scientists within the Bureau were hopeful about the potential for pruning as a method of saving
elms, especially once it was discovered that the fungus could potentially infect trees without
causing symptoms. Strong’s commitment to his own understanding of best practices ensured

131

these voices would be ignored. Had the Bureau been managed in a way that allowed for disparate
opinions regarding how to manage the disease to be seriously considered, it is possible the
management protocol and its outcome would have looked very different.
These administrative failings had important implications for the protocols undertaken by
the program, that in turn led to a number of procedural failings. Strong’s insistence on
exterminating the fungus over controlling it, for example, led to his decision to allow silvicide to
be used in the field before it had been thoroughly tested by scientists as a reasonable means of
vector reduction. Because of this, the use of silvicide techniques actually increased the amount of
ideal vector habitat in the disease zone. Similarly, his refusal to experiment with pruning ensured
the removal of many elms that, though infected, might have survived with maintenance.
Additionally, despite having a Bureau chief so deeply entrenched in the priorities of the program,
implying that all levels of the Bureau were working together, the quarantine and control efforts
were very poorly coordinated. Field crews working on eradication and control created weekly
reports on disease presence, including results of perimeter inspections around the known infected
zone to determine whether or not that area was increasing. But the data they generated were
either withheld from, or not acknowledged by, those tasked with updating the quarantine. This
led to the quarantine consistently lagging behind the known spread of the disease, rendering it
functionally obsolete. The administrative disparities between the field work, data management
and quarantine updates directly tie to the procedural failure to update the quarantine regularly.
From a theoretical perspective, the failure of the Dutch elm disease program, especially
in Syracuse, highlights an important dissonance between the way we discuss urban forests and
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the ways we are capable of managing them. That is, urban forests are defined as all the trees and
their associated green space within a city, regardless of owner. However, as the Syracuse case
study demonstrates, the urban forest is not a single unit in terms of management. Every property
owner within the city is ultimately the decisionmaker for their parcel of the urban forest. The
theory of the ecological commons provides a scholarly concept of discussing this issue, and the
effects in Syracuse clearly demonstrate the result of not understanding or acknowledging it in
management plans. This dissonance is similarly reflected in the management of the federal
program. Officials and the public alike acknowledged that the project was to save the elms due to
their prominence and popularity in cities, but never seem to reconcile or acknowledge the fact
that the bulk of the work of that project occurred in the countryside. The asymmetrical balance of
where management was taking place, versus where the effects were hoped to be felt, underscored
limitations of both the protocols used and the decision making that led to those protocols.
Ultimately, if both rural and urban trees had been equally valued and/or equally available for
management, it is possible the management program and its outcome could have looked very
different. Mark Fiege was one of the first authors to discuss the ecological commons when
analyzing weeds and common spaces in the Western United States. 1 He and others have
demonstrated the utility and importance of the concept in ecological management studies in rural

Mark Fiege, “The Weedy West: Mobile Nature, Boundaries, and Common Space in the Montana
Landscape,” Western Historical Quarterly 36, no. 1 (February 1, 2005): 22–47; Mark Fiege, “Private Property and
Ecological Commons in the American West,” in Every Day America: Cultural Landscape Studies after J.B.
Jackson, ed. Chris Wilson and Paul Groth (University of California Press, 2003), 249–31.
1
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locales. 2 This dissertation shows how it is critical to incorporate ideas of the ecological commons
into urban spaces and their management to successfully prevent further epidemics from
overtaking urban forests.
There is no one reason that can be assigned to explain the failure of the efforts to stop
Dutch elm disease. The complexity of the fungus’ lifecycle and its ability to spread
asymptomatically, the spatial distribution of the hosts and vectors, the decisions made regarding
the handling of those factors, and the people in charge of making those decisions, were all factors
that intersected in such a way that made the project too cumbersome, and doomed it to failure.
However, narratives that reduce the project and its aftermath to simple problems of funding, lack
of workers, or biogeographic inevitability overlook much of the nuance that emerges in the
documents examined in this dissertation.
Scholarly Impact
In addition to the lessons about Dutch elm disease and pest management in general, this
dissertation presents several lessons for scholars. The quarantine and eradication chapters serve
to demonstrate that biogeographers must take human decision-making into account when
analyzing not only distribution of species purposefully cultivated by people, but also the spread
of diseases and pests that affect ecosystems (whether urban or not). Especially when discussing
species that are managed by people, whether their introduction is intentional or invasive, the

Julia Hobson Haggerty and William R. Travis, “Out of Administrative Control: Absentee Owners,
Resident Elk and the Shifting Nature of Wildlife Management in Southwestern Montana,” Geoforum 37, no. 5
(September 1, 2006): 816–30.
2

134

decisions people make regarding their management is crucial to understanding when, where and
why species are distributed. Similarly, this project makes a case for further historical case studies
of biogeographic processes, especially where past understandings of those processes might have
overlooked the human impact on the results of such studies. Urban forestry studies also benefit
from this lesson.
This study also joins recent publications in urban forestry in showing the utility of
incorporating historical analyses of urban forests. While most urban forestry literature analyzes
the contemporary canopy conditions of various cities, it must be acknowledged that those
conditions came to be due to historical decision making. That is, where trees are located within a
city, the species that have been planted, and how old they are must be understood within the
history and ecology of the city and the city official’s decisions to plant those trees, potentially
several decades ago. Roman and her co-authors acknowledge several “historical legacy affects”
that influence contemporary urban forests and their patterns. 3 However, it can be difficult to
acquire historical data regarding urban forest changes, thus making quantitative studies difficult
to accomplish and thus rare. 4 This dissertation demonstrates the utility and the importance of
qualitative archival analysis in creating a full documentation of both human and biophysical
legacy effects, especially when useful quantitative data is not available. These historical
understandings are key to contextualizing current urban forest patterns and analyses that link

Lara A. Roman et al., “Human and Biophysical Legacies Shape Contemporary Urban Forests: A
Literature Synthesis,” Urban Forestry & Urban Greening 31 (April 1, 2018): 157–68.
4
M.T. Bonney and Y. He, “Attributing Drivers to Spatio-Temporal Changes in Tree Density across a
Suburbanizing Landscape since 1944,” Landscape and Urban Planning 192 (2019).
3
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inequalities of urban tree cover to other systemic environmental justice issues. 5 They also
provide groundwork for understanding the future of urban forests as management decisions are
made to address those inequities. 6
The work demonstrates the well-known importance of space and place to environmental
historians. 7 The findings in the quarantine chapter are built on cartography and would have
eluded even the most comprehensive textual analysis without the incorporation of this element.
The value of HGIS is gaining prominence in environmental history, though as seen in the
eradication chapter and the Syracuse case study its utility is limited by data availability and past
data management practices. 8 However, even without employing HGIS to analyze Syracuse’s
management strategies, the case study still provides the important lesson that average cities are
similarly worthy of engagement as historical case studies. While environmental histories often
focus on major metropolises, case studies from smaller cities can provide different insights,
which may actually be applicable to a wider range of settings.

S.T.A. Pickett et al., “Urban Ecological Systems: Linking Terrestrial Ecological, Physical, and
Socioeconomic Components of Metropolitan Areas,” Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 32 (2001): 127–57.
6
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Programs in the Northeastern United States,” Urban Forestry and Urban Greening 55 (2020).
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Richard White, “American Environmental History: The Development of a New Historical Field,” Pacific
Historical Review 54, no. 3 (1985): 297–335.
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Geoff Cunfer, “Causes of the Dust Bowl,” in Past Time, Past Place: GIS for History, ed. Anne Kelly
Knowles (Redlands, CA: ESRI Press, 2002); Knowles, “Emerging Trends in Historical GIS”; Anne Kelly Knowles,
“The Contested Nature of Historical GIS,” International Journal of Geographical Information Science 28, no. 1
(2014): 206–11.
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Future Directions
This dissertation provides a detailed picture of the federal response to Dutch elm disease and
helps to develop the practical and theoretical implications of the program’s failure. However, the
story of Dutch elm disease is far from closed with this dissertation. Building on the Syracuse
case study presented here, future work could focus on identifying the varied responses of
individual cities to the epidemic. Although cities across the country were affected by the
epidemic, not all of them took the same management strategy or had the same outcomes as
Syracuse. Indeed, some still maintain large populations of American elm despite the fungus’
presence. Identifying and analyzing such cases, in addition to comparing them, would allow a
deeper understanding of the challenges and options urban foresters face when dealing with pests
and pathogens. This is especially important given the likelihood of the continued piecemeal
approach to protecting urban forests.
Additionally, this work leads to the question of what happened to urban forests after
Dutch elm disease. What, if anything, did cities do to reforest after the elms were lost? How did
the decisions regarding reforestation, if they were made, reflect other patterns of decision making
within cities? It is well established that urban canopies are correlated with demographics. That is,
wealthier/whiter areas tend to be ‘better’ forested that poor/minority neighborhoods. However, it
takes time for trees to grow, thus the canopy we see today is a reflection of decisions made
decades ago. Dutch elm disease and the story laid out in this dissertation explain, to an extent,
why some of those gaps in the canopy came to be.
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Finally, the Dutch elm disease eradication project raises an important question regarding
the relationship between urban forests and their surrounding ecosystems. A city’s location leads
to limiting environmental factors that influence what kind of trees can grow there. For example,
a dry climate would preclude most large trees, or a cool environment would encourage deciduous
species. However, the interactions between urban forests and the environment they are nested
within are crucial to understanding both. In practice, a huge component of the Dutch elm disease
program was focused on managing the forests around cities as opposed to the urban elms
themselves. How does pest management within a city affect the efforts to manage forests outside
of cities? The relationship between cities and their hinterlands is not a new topic. However, the
understanding of the management of pests within and around cities for the purpose of saving city
trees is a potentially fruitful avenue for future work. A historical lens would once again be useful
in such a project, to reiterate the importance of how these decisions made in the past have
affected both the cities and their surroundings that we see today.
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